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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

ESSAYS ON ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY
Environmental goals such as urban water conservation and pollution control regulations are typically
achieved through price and non-price methods. This dissertation offers an analysis of the non-price
approaches, including the rationing of water for particular users, installation of particular technologies,
and adoption of particular certifications to achieve environmental goals. To begin, an analysis of California’s

2015 urban water conservation mandate was performed. Results indicate that the average welfare
loss of the mandate is $6,107 per acre-foot of restriction in Northern California and $2,757 per acrefoot of restriction in Southern California. In terms of monthly household-level willingness-to-pay
(WTP) to avoid the mandate, results illustrate that households have a WTP between $5 and $200 per
month. Northern Californian utilities were generally in compliance with their mandated conservation
targets, while Southern Californian utilities tended to fall short. The second essay focuses on
analyzing how web-based Home Water Use Reports (HWURs) affect household-level water
consumption in Folsom City, California. The HWURs under study, offered by the
company Dropcountr (DC), share social comparisons, consumption analytics, and conservation
information to residential accounts, primarily through digital communications. We found that there is
a 7.8% reduction in average daily household water consumption for a typical household under
treatment of the DC program. Results suggest that the effect of DC varies by the baseline
consumption quintile, the number of months in the program, the day of the week, message type, and
enrollment wave. Furthermore, we find that indicate these responses to DC program likely come
from the information channel rather than moral suasion. The final essay studies the effectiveness of
ISO-14001 on pollution reduction as a non-price pollution control approach. Manufacturers have
been increasingly relying on environmental management systems (such as ISO 14001 based ones) to
comply with government regulations and reduce waste. In this essay, we investigated the impact of
ISO 14001 certification on manufacturers’ toxic release by release level. Results show that ISO
14001 had a negative and statistically significant effect on the top 10% manufacturing sites regarding
the on-site toxic release, but it did not reduce off-site toxic release. Therefore, one should not expect
ISO 14001 to have a uniform impact on manufacturing sites’ environmental performance. For large
firms, encouraging voluntary adoption of ISO 14001 might be an effective government strategy to
reduce on-site pollution.

KEYWORDS: Non-price environmental policy, Water Conservation, Automated Meters,
Mandate, ISO-14001.
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Policymakers have two broad types of instruments for meeting environmental goals.
They can use non-price methods including regulatory—command and control-- and
voluntary approaches, or they can use market-based approaches that rely on market
forces. Despite the popularity of non-price approaches, empirical work is credibly
identifying both the effectiveness and consequences of these policies as well as the
heterogeneous effects of these policies among different groups remains in its infancy. My
dissertation focuses on the development of empirical methods to investigate the non-price
approaches in addressing environmental issues as well as exploring the heterogenous
implications of these policies.
These questions are important not only as a justification for using non-price
approaches to achieve environmental goals and evaluating alternative options but also for
understanding how heterogenous effects may shape the design and implementation of
these policies. For example, a general problem with the regulatory approaches, such as
urban water mandates, is that they are associated with consumer or producer welfare
losses. It is important to assess these losses because it improves our understanding of the
cost of these policies which is maybe to some policymakers is not so tangible. Also,
estimating welfare cost of such policies is useful for evaluating alternative policy options
including market-based approaches. A general problem with voluntary actions to reduce
environmental externalities, such as reducing water consumption or pollution level, is
that it is empirically difficult to assess the success of these programs. However, given the
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number of voluntary approaches being implemented in the United States as a way to
achieve the environmental goals, measuring the effectiveness of these programs has
become increasingly important. My dissertation investigates these questions in the
context of programs and policies that are important in their own right. Chapter 2 of my
dissertation explores the welfare costs associated with the recent environmental
regulatory program in the United States, California’s 2015 urban water mandate.
Chapters 3 and 4 examine the effectiveness of voluntary policies in the context of water
conservation technology adoption and pollution reduction certification adoption. My
dissertation remains unified in both its subject matter and methodological approach –
using unique sources of data and sound research designs to understand important issues
in environmental policy.
Furthermore, both welfare losses of regulatory approaches and effectiveness of
voluntary approaches are potentially different among different groups of consumers or
producers, for example, depending on the income, consumption or production level, firm
size or other demographics Understanding heterogeneous effects of these policies will
allow targeting groups that are most responsive, which will be a cost-effective strategy
(Djebbari and Smith 2008, Ferraro and Miranda 2013, Heckman, Smith, and Clements
1997). Also, investigating heterogeneous effects by subgroups helps researchers
understand generalizability of the result to other populations and places (Ferraro and
Miranda 2013, Imai and Ratkovic 2013, Manski 2004). In all three essays, I examine the
heterogeneity of the results and evaluate the implications of these heterogeneities.

1.2 Objectives and Structure
The purpose of this dissertation is to improve our understanding of regulatory and
2

voluntary approaches as an environmental policy. The primary focuses are on
understanding welfare effects of regulatory policies, the effectiveness of voluntary
approaches and heterogeneity of these effects. To achieve these goals, we focus on three
programs in the United States. First, we examine the recent regulatory policy that has
been implemented in California. In April 2015, governor of California, Jerry Brown,
issued an executive order mandating a statewide reduction in urban water use by 25%
because of a multi-year drought. We estimate the welfare losses due to California’s 2015
water conservation mandate as a regulatory approach. Second, we examine the
effectiveness of a voluntary water consumption analytics program to reduce water
consumption. Finally, we study the effectiveness of voluntary adoption of ISO-14001
certification by manufacturing facilities on pollution reduction.
In the second chapter, we measure the welfare consequences of the 2015
California drought mandate. In response to the severe California drought, in April 2015
Governor Jerry Brown issued an executive order mandating a statewide reduction in
water use. The mandate aims to reduce the amount of water consumed statewide in urban
areas by 25% from 2013 levels. The State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB)
proposed regulatory instructions that grouped urban water suppliers into nine tiers, with
conservation standards ranging from 8% to 36%. In this chapter, we evaluate welfare
losses due to this mandate. Understanding the proposed regulation’s welfare losses
requires estimating water demand. Using a fixed effect model and data from 2004 to
2009 on 111 urban water utilities an annual demand curve is estimated. The estimated
demand elasticity is between -0.61 and -0.1 which is heterogeneous across the regions. In
the second step, we use estimated annual demand function to recover price elasticities in
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a sample of 53 urban water utilities in California which provide water for more than 20
million customers. We calculate the average welfare loss of the mandate to be $6,107 per
acre-foot of restriction in Northern California and $2,757 per acre-foot of restriction in
Southern California. In terms of monthly household-level willingness-to-pay (WTP) to
avoid the mandate, we find households have a WTP between $5 and $200 per month.
Northern Californian utilities were generally in compliance with their mandated
conservation targets, while Southern Californian utilities tended to fall short. In addition,
using data on changes in actual consumption during the drought we estimate welfare
losses under imperfect compliance with the mandate.
The second essay (chapter three) focuses on understanding heterogeneous effects of
consumption analytics on residential water consumption. This essay estimates how
web-based Home Water Use Reports (HWURs) affect household-level water
consumption in Folsom City, California. The HWURs under study, offered by the
company Dropcountr (DC), share social comparisons, consumption analytics, and
conservation information to residential accounts, primarily through digital
communications. The data utilized in this essay is a daily panel tracking single-family
residential households from January-2013 to May-2017. We found that there is a 7.8%
reduction in average daily household water consumption for a typical household who
enrolled in DC program. Results suggest that the effect of DC varies by the baseline
consumption quintile, the number of months in the program, the day of the week,
quartile of the year, message type, and enrollment wave. We also conduct empirical
tests to evaluate the channels through which DC may act to reduce consumption.
Results indicate these responses to DC program likely come from the information
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channel rather than moral suasion. Furthermore, our results indicate that providing
consumption and pricing information may not improve the effectiveness of non-linear
pricing.
Chapter 4 details the third essay, with a focus on voluntary action to reduce
pollution. In this essay, we evaluate the effect of the ISO-14001 standard on firms’
environmental performance. Manufacturers have been increasingly relying on
environmental management systems (such as ISO 14001 based ones) to comply with
government regulations and reduce waste. In this essay, we investigated the impact of
ISO 14001 certification as a voluntary approach to manufacturers’ toxic release by
release level. Our theoretical model suggests that ISO 14001 effect on pollution is
mixed depending on the initial pollution levels. In the empirical section of this essay,
we applied the censored quantile instrumental variable estimator (CQIV) to data on the
U.S. transportation equipment manufacturing subsector facilities. Results show that ISO
14001 had a negative and statistically significant effect on the top 10% manufacturing
sites regarding the on-site toxic release, but it did not reduce off-site toxic release.
Therefore, one should not expect ISO 14001 to have a uniform impact on
manufacturing sites’ environmental performance. For large firms, encouraging
voluntary adoption of ISO 14001 might be an effective government strategy to reduce
on-site pollution. However, for small firms and to reduce off-site pollution, other
economic incentives or regulations are warranted.
From a broader perspective, these papers shed light on the non-price approaches as
an environmental policy. We examine welfare consequences and effectiveness of
regulatory and voluntary approaches and how these effects could be heterogeneous

5

among different subgroups. Chapter 5 summarizes the collective findings and provides
some discussion of potential implications.
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Chapter 2.
WELFARE CONSEQUENCES OF CALIFORNIA’S 2015 DROUGHT
WATER CONSERVATION MANDATE
Abstract
In April 2015, California Governor Jerry Brown issued an executive order mandating a
statewide reduction in water use by 25% in urban areas because of a multi-year drought.
We estimate the mandate’s effect on consumer welfare losses using a novel panel dataset
of price and monthly water consumption data on 111 water utilities to estimate utilityspecific demand curves. We calculate the average welfare loss of the mandate to be
$6,107 per acre-foot of restriction in Northern California and $2,757 per acre-foot of
restriction in Southern California. Regarding monthly household-level willingness-topay (WTP) to avoid the mandate, we find households have a WTP between $5 and $200
per month. Northern Californian utilities were generally in compliance with their
mandated conservation targets, while Southern Californian utilities tended to fall short.
Also, using data on changes in actual consumption during the drought we estimate
welfare losses under imperfect compliance with the mandate.
Keywords: California, demand, government policy, urban water utilities, water supply
restriction
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2.1 Introduction
The recent California drought, which began with an abnormally dry period in late 2011
and was declared over in April 2017, was one of the most extreme on record,
characterized by low precipitation and high temperatures (Shukla et al. 2015). The
drought impacted local communities, ecosystems, and the economy in a multitude of
ways; for instance, during this period there was a rapid drawdown of groundwater
reserves (Famiglietti 2014, Harter and Dahlke 2014) and an increase in agricultural land
fallowing (Howitt et al. 2014). In response to these drought conditions, in April 2015,
Governor Jerry Brown issued an executive order mandating a 25% reduction in urban
water use effective between June 2015 and February 2016. This reduction was projected
to save approximately 1.3 million acre-feet of water over the 9-month period.
The California State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB), the state agency
responsible for the implementation of the order, initially proposed a relatively uniform set
of restrictions across water utilities. The final regulation, however, departed from that
approach, setting the highest percentage reductions on those utilities with the highest
water use regarding gallons per capita per day (GPCD). Under the SWRCB’s adopted
regulation, only urban water utilities serving more than 3,000 customers or delivering
more than 3,000 acre-feet (AF) of water per year were required to reduce their customers’
water consumption, with restrictions ranging from 4% to 36% of baseline usage (the
adopted schedule defines nine conservation standards based on the per capita water usage
during 2014 summer months; see Table 2-1 for the schedule). According to the SWRCB,
the 411 urban water utilities subject to this mandate provide more than 90% of urban
water supplies in California.1 In this paper, we quantify the welfare consequences of
1

A large number of very small suppliers serving less than 3,000 customers exist in California.
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these restrictions for residential consumers in Northern and Southern California.2 We
compare our predicted welfare losses, which assume perfect implementation of the
restrictions, to estimates of actual welfare losses based on realized reductions in
consumption.
Restricting urban water use is a common drought management strategy in many
parts of the United States. Most urban water restrictions focus on the single-family
residential sector (Mansur and Olmstead 2012) because it is generally considered to have
lower value use than the multi-family residential, commercial, and industrial sectors.
Moreover, reducing residential consumption is generally expected to result in fewer job
losses and output effects than restricting commercial and industrial water use. In
California, the residential sector accounts for one-half to two-thirds of urban water use in
a typical community. Thus, the largest costs of restrictions are consumer welfare losses
resulting from reduced water consumption. As demonstrated by Buck et al. (2016),
because water rates are often more than marginal supply costs, the consumer welfare
loss from mandatory conservation can be significantly higher than the loss evaluated
using standard consumer surplus measures of welfare.
Our preferred estimates suggest that the predicted consumer welfare losses
experienced as a consequence of utility-specific water restrictions were approximately
$875 million across the utilities in our sample. Not surprisingly, predicted welfare losses
under a uniform restriction of 25% across all utilities are larger—welfare losses under
such a scenario are estimated to be under $1.20 billion. While the bulk of the welfare

2

Urban locations in Northern California include the City and County of San Francisco and their wholesale
customers. Urban locations in Southern California include those serviced by the Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California—these are the greater Los Angeles and San Diego regions.

9

losses were experienced in Southern California where the population is larger, perhousehold losses are larger in Northern California. Average welfare losses in Southern
California are approximately $2,800 per acre-foot of reduced consumption, while they
are $6,100 per acre-foot in Northern California. Our estimates suggest that the household
willingness-to-pay (WTP) to avoid the 2015 mandatory restrictions is $26 per month in
Southern California and $24 per month in Northern California under typical
consumption levels.
Water utilities do not have complete control over their customers, so it is not
surprising that actual changes in consumption did not perfectly match the mandated
reductions for each utility. We also calculate welfare losses under actual changes in
consumption. The welfare results for observed changes in consumption differ somewhat
from those which assumed reductions in consumption equal to mandated levels. In
general, consumers in Northern California met or exceeded their conservation targets,
while consumers in Southern California often fell short.

2.2 Welfare Loss Framework
We determine welfare losses in the residential sector using a measure of consumers’
WTP to avoid water supply restriction, which is similar to other recent works (Brozović,
Sunding, and Zilberman 2007, Buck et al. 2016). Notably, among water utilities in
California, and the United States more broadly, volumetric water rates reflect both
variable and fixed costs. Often the fixed cost component of price is considerable; thus,
the consumer surplus triangle can underestimate losses experienced by consumers. Buck
et al. (2016) provide evidence of average cost pricing among public water utilities in
California. Consistent with this, we measure welfare losses as the area under the demand
10

curve and above the marginal costs curve. We assume a constant elasticity of demand and
estimate the single-family residential water demand elasticities for each urban water
utility using the functional form:
𝑃𝑖 =

1
𝜀𝑖
𝐴𝑖 𝑄𝑖

(𝑖 = 1,2,3, … , 𝑛) (1)

where, 𝐴𝑖 is a constant and 𝜀𝑖 is the elasticity of water demand in utility i. We denote
price and quantity of water consumption by households in urban water utility service area
i prior to the mandatory supply restriction as 𝑃𝑖∗ and 𝑄𝑖∗ , respectively.
Let 𝑄𝑖 (𝑟𝑖𝑡 ) indicate available water supply for urban water utility i under a
restriction for utility i at time t; assume 𝑄𝑖 (𝑟𝑖𝑡 ) < 𝑄𝑖∗ . We define available supply under a
restriction as:
𝑄𝑖 (𝑟𝑖𝑡 ) = (1 − 𝑟𝑖𝑡 )𝑄𝑖∗

(2)

Using equations (1) and (2), we can estimate consumers’ willingness-to-pay to
avoid a supply restriction 𝑟𝑖𝑡 by integrating under the isoelastic demand curve between
baseline consumption 𝑄𝑖∗ and consumption under the restriction, 𝑄𝑖 (𝑟𝑖𝑡 ). This is
demonstrated with the equalities below:
𝑊𝑖 (𝑟𝑖𝑡 ) = ∫

𝑄𝑖∗

𝑄𝑖∗

𝑃𝑖 (𝑄)𝑑𝑄 = ∫

𝑄𝑖 (𝑟𝑖𝑡 )

𝑄𝑖 (𝑟𝑖𝑡 )

1
𝜀𝑖
𝐴𝑖 𝑄𝑖 𝑑𝑄

=

1+𝜀𝑖
𝜀𝑖
𝑃𝑖∗ 𝑄𝑖∗ [1 − (1 − 𝑟𝑖𝑡 ) 𝜀𝑖 ] (3)
1 + 𝜀𝑖

Note that an urban water utility’s total cost of service is the sum of fixed cost
(e.g., infrastructure costs, repair, and maintenance, administrative expenses, etc.) and
variable cost (e.g., energy and chemical costs of treating water), with the latter depending
on the amount of water delivered to customers. Supply restrictions reduce variable costs
simply because the urban water utility i supplies less water, recall that 𝑄𝑖 (𝑟𝑖𝑡 ) < 𝑄𝑖∗ . The
11

measure of WTP to avoid a restriction – indicated in equation (3) – does not account for
the avoided costs of service delivery when there is a supply restriction; therefore,
equation (3) is not a correct measure of welfare losses.
Assuming the marginal cost of service delivery is 𝐶𝑖 , equation (3) becomes as
follows:
∗

𝑄𝑖
1+𝜀𝑖
𝜀𝑖
∗ ∗
𝜀
𝑖
𝑊𝑖 (𝑟𝑖𝑡 ) =
𝑃 𝑄 [1 − (1 − 𝑟𝑖𝑡 )
] −∫
𝐶𝑖 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥 (4)
1 + 𝜀𝑖 𝑖 𝑖
𝑄𝑖 (𝑟𝑖𝑡 )

Assuming a flat marginal cost curve, we can re-write the welfare loss function as
follows:
𝑊𝑖 (𝑟𝑖𝑡 ) =

1+𝜀𝑖
𝜀𝑖
𝑃𝑖∗ 𝑄𝑖∗ [1 − (1 − 𝑟𝑖𝑡 ) 𝜀𝑖 ] − 𝑟𝑖𝑡 𝑄𝑖∗ 𝐶𝑖 (5)
1 + 𝜀𝑖

Under the assumption of a flat marginal cost curve, the average loss per unit of
restriction is:
𝑊𝑖 /𝑄𝑖∗ 𝑟𝑖𝑡 =

1+𝜀𝑖
𝜀𝑖
𝑃𝑖∗ [1 − (1 − 𝑟𝑖𝑡 ) 𝜀𝑖 ] /𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖 (6)
1 + 𝜀𝑖

Based on equation (6), the average welfare loss resulting from a supply restriction
is a function of the elasticity of demand in service area i, the initial water price before the
supply restriction in water utility i at time t, and the variable cost of service in water
utility i.

2.3 Residential Water Demand Estimation
Accurate price elasticity of water demand is essential for measuring consumer welfare
losses associated with California’s 2015 restrictions. Arbués, Garcıa-Valiñas, and
Martınez-Espiñeira (2003) overview methodologies for estimation of water demand by
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analyzing different specifications of water demand models, functional forms, different
data sets, selection of variables, and type of price specification. Additional examples of
water demand estimation and associated issues are described in several works in the
United States (Gaudin 2006, Hewitt and Hanemann 1995, Olmstead, Hanemann, and
Stavins 2007, Pint 1999, Renwick and Green 2000) and around the world (e.g., in France,
Nauges and Thomas (2003); in Germany, Schleich and Hillenbrand (2009); in Italy,
Mazzanti and Montini (2006); in Spain, Martinez-Espineira (2007)). We use these studies
to frame our empirical demand model regarding specification, functional form, and
choice of control variables.
Water consumption is measured as the average household consumption for each
utility and month in the dataset. In terms of functional form, the log-log model is used,
where all continuous variables enter into the regression equation in logarithmic form.
This functional form has frequently been used in previous studies (Frondel and Messner
2008, Mazzanti and Montini 2006, Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins 2007). An
attractive feature of this form is that the coefficient on price can be interpreted as the
price elasticity of demand.
One potential issue is whether the estimator for this coefficient suffers from
simultaneity bias. Consistent with other similar settings (Buck et al. 2016, Olmstead and
Stavins 2009), water rates are set by local government, rather than the market supply and
demand equilibrium; this should break possible simultaneity bias. Despite this, the crosssectional analysis is still vulnerable to omitted variable bias, which can arise from a
variety of unobserved factors (Billings and Agthe 1980, Gaudin 2006, Martínez-Espiñeira
2002). To address bias resulting from omitted time-invariant demand factors, utility fixed
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effects are included in the preferred demand specification.

2.3.1 Econometric specification & data
We use a fixed effects estimator with utility and year fixed effects. The base equation we
estimate is reported in equation (7):
ln(𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑡 ) = 𝛽1 ln(𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡 ) + 𝛽2 ln(𝑊𝑖𝑚𝑡 ) + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑚𝑡

(7)

where 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑡 is the average single family residential consumption in utility service area i in
month m and year t; 𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡 is the marginal price per hundred cubic foot (CCF) on the
median tier of the price schedule; 𝑊𝑖𝑚𝑡 is a vector of precipitation and temperature
measures; 𝜇𝑖 is a utility service area fixed effect; 𝜃𝑡 is a year fixed effect; and 𝑢𝑖𝑚𝑡
captures all unobserved factors affecting the dependent variable. Spatial heterogeneity is
modeled by interacting price with median household income and a region indicator
variable; see Reiss and White (2005) for a commonly cited example of this interaction.
The residential demand estimation uses utility-level panel data on average
monthly water consumption and annual price, between January 2004 and December
2009, for single-family residential consumers in California. One of the advantages of
using monthly data is that we can tailor our analysis to the mandate period (June 2015 –
February-2016). Thus, we estimate the elasticity of water demand using the relevant
period and drop observations from March, April, and May 2015. The dataset includes 90
urban water utilities in the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD)
and 21 utilities in the San Francisco Bay Area. Consumption and price data for water
utilities in the San Francisco Bay Area were obtained from the Bay Area & Water Supply
Conservation Agency Annual Surveys from 2004-2009; similar data for water utilities in
the MWD service area were obtained by directly contacting each water utility.
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We measure utility-level average monthly water consumption per household in
hundreds of cubic feet (CCF). Table 2-2 provides descriptive statistics for water
consumption by region and season in 2009. Water consumption in sample utilities located
in Southern California is, on average, 1.6 times higher than water consumption in sample
utilities located in Northern California. This pattern reflects somewhat lower densities
and drier conditions in Southern California, which leads to more outdoor water use and
higher overall consumption. Not surprisingly, there is an even larger gap in residential
consumption between Southern and Northern California during the summer months,
when landscape irrigation is more common.
We use Census tract data from the year 2000 to obtain information on median
household income and household size. The measure of lot size is derived from data
collected by DataQuick. Utility-specific measures of these variables are generated using
the intersection between utility-specific borders and Census tract borders. This allows us
to generate a weighted-average of these variables that reflect the population of singlefamily residential households for each specific utility. In addition, we include weather
drivers of residential demand (precipitation and temperature), which are obtained from
PRISM (Parameter-elevation Regressions on Independent Slopes Model) group data.

2.3.2 Estimation results
The results of the residential water demand estimation are presented in Table 2-3.
Column (1) of Table 2-3 presents the baseline fixed effects model corresponding to
Equation (7). The estimated price elasticity of demand is -0.198. In Column (2), we add
weather variables (average daily maximum temperature and monthly precipitation) and
month of year fixed effects to control for seasonality. Since neither the year-to-year
15

variation in weather nor the month of year fixed effects is correlated with price, we do
not expect the point estimate to change much. Consistent with this, we obtain an
estimated price elasticity of demand of -0.207. The primary objective of adding these
additional controls is to explain variation in consumption, and by doing so, reduce the
standard error for the coefficient on our price measure. Notably, the within R-squared
increases from 0.021 to 0.543 and precision improves, though not by a significant degree
(t-stat increases from 2.07 to 2.19). One concern with the specifications in the first two
columns is that they are vulnerable to bias resulting from omitted time-variant variables
related to both price and consumption. To address this concern, in Column (3) we
estimate a model that includes county-specific linear and quadratic time trends. These
variables control for time-variant county level unobservables that share a common trend
within a county. An example is conservation efforts since water utilities in the same
county generally share common conservation programs. Under this specification, we
observe an estimated price elasticity of -0.23.
To demonstrate the utility of using monthly, instead of annual water consumption
data, Column (4) of Table 2-3 presents demand estimation results in which annual data
has been used to estimate the price elasticity of demand. The elasticity point estimate
using annual data is -0.184; we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the point estimates
in Column (3) and Column (4) are identical.
In the final specification presented in Table 2-3, we add interaction between price
and income. This interaction term captures how price responses vary by household
income level. Because the price elasticity of demand is negative, a positive coefficient on
the interaction term indicates a decrease in the price response as income increases—
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thereby implying less elastic demand. Results for this specification are reported in
Column (5) of Table 2-3 and indicate that the price elasticity of water demand in an urban
water utility with a median household income of $65,000 would be -0.19. Moving
forward, we use this specification to estimate elasticities for the welfare loss calculations.

2.4 Welfare Analysis
Welfare losses resulting from restrictions on residential water consumption in Northern
and Southern California are quantified using equation (5) and consumption data from the
year 2013 (the baseline period according to the SWRCB regulation) encompassing 53
urban water utilities in California, including 27 utilities in the San Francisco Bay Area of
Northern California and 26 utilities in the Los Angeles and San Diego regions of
Southern California. The mandate affects the entire residential sector, both single and
multi-family residential consumers. The econometric analysis in the preceding section
focused on the single-family residential sector because comparable data is not available
for the multi-family residential sector. Therefore, in the subsequent welfare analysis, we
assume single and multi-family sectors have identical elasticities. This is a simplifying
assumption which acts to under-estimate losses for at least two reasons. First, the multifamily residential sector mainly consists of indoor water consumption, so these users
have fewer margins on which to reduce water consumption compared to consumers in the
single-family residential sector. This suggests more inelastic demand for the multi-family
residential sector. Second, precisely because the two sectors’ demand curves are
different, the efficient distribution of restrictions across the two sectors would not be
proportional. Grouping them with an identical elasticity implicitly assumes proportional
rationing across the single and multi-family residential demand sectors. In this case,
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proportional rationing is inefficient because it does not account for the more elastic
demand in the single-family residential sector. By combining these sectors, we are
implicitly avoiding any incremental losses that would result from an inefficient allocation
of restrictions between these different sectors. Therefore, these assumptions may result in
reduced estimates for the consumer welfare consequences of the mandate.

2.4.1 Data for calculation of welfare losses
From equation (5), the calculation of welfare losses requires data on baseline price,
baseline quantity demanded, the percentage of use restricted, the price elasticity of
demand, and the marginal cost of service delivery.3
We use consumption data from the year 2013 as our baseline, or pre-drought,
quantity-demanded. Data were obtained from the SWRCB, which calculates an estimate
of residential water consumption by month for approximately 400 water utilities in
California. For the Northern California utilities that belong to Bay Area Water Supply &
Conservation Agency (BAWSCA), the price data comes from median tier price reported
in the BAWSCA survey for the year 2014. Prices for the other utilities were obtained
from their website or through a telephone interview. In the case of wholesale utilities,
including many of the utilities that belong to the MWD, no single median tier price exists
because they sell their water to multiple local utilities that set their rates. Thus, for each
wholesale utility, we collect rate information on every local utility within the wholesale
utility and then generate a quantity-weighted average of the median tier price. Figure 2-1
presents the range of median tier prices (converted to price per acre-foot of water) for

3

For the marginal cost of service delivery we use $193 per acre-foot based of previous
work by Buck et al. (2016), which relies on financial documents from California utilities.
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these 53 urban water utilities. The mean, minimum and maximum prices per acre-foot in
Northern California are $2,513, $1,446, and $4,217, respectively. The mean, minimum
and maximum prices per acre-foot in Southern California are $1,526, $674, and $2,943,
respectively.
The demand estimation result presented in Column (5) of Table 2-3 suggests that
the price elasticity of water is significantly different across utilities throughout California,
according to median household income levels. The distributions of elasticities implied
from this result for the Northern and Southern California utilities of interest are displayed
in Figure 2-2.4 Estimated mean, minimum and maximum price elasticities in Northern
California utilities are -0.16, -0.32, and -0.1, respectively. Estimated mean, minimum and
maximum price elasticities in Southern California utilities are -0.29, -0.50, and -0.1,
respectively.5 This suggests that consumers in Southern California may be able to
accommodate water restrictions than consumers in Northern California more easily. This
is consistent with the pattern of cut-backs ultimately adopted by the SWRCB, in which
Southern California faced more stringent requirements than Northern California. These
primary observations suggest there are likely efficiency gains from the SWRCB
conservation program relative to uniform restrictions across utilities.
Welfare losses for two regulatory scenarios are estimated to examine whether there
are welfare improvements from choosing the SWRCB restrictions instead of a uniform
cut-back across utilities. In the first scenario, we assume a uniform percentage restriction
(25%) relative to baseline consumption during the year 2013 (less consumption during

We construct measures of median household income for each of the 53 utilities based on data from the
American Community Survey.
5 For utilities with a GPCPD greater than 150.
4
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March, April, and May, which are excluded under the SWRCB regulation). This scenario
is representative of a naïve policy option in which policymakers do not differentiate
requirements based on variation in the values for the marginal unit of water across
utilities. For example, under this policy, utilities with high and low outdoor water
consumption will face the same percentage cut-backs. In the second scenario, we assume
utility-specific restrictions based on the SWRCB utility-level conservation standards
(henceforth, this scenario is referenced as the SWRCB conservation program). Under the
SWRCB conservation program, urban water utilities are assigned to reduce their total
consumption from June 2015 through February 2016 at rates between 4% and 36% based
on historical consumption levels. In the case of wholesale utilities, no single conservation
standard exists because they sell their water to multiple local utilities, which have their
conservation standard from SWRCB. Thus, for each wholesale utility, we collect
conservation standard information on every local utility within the wholesale utility and
use this information to calculate a household-weighted average conservation standard.
Figure 2-3 shows the distribution of mandatory conservation percentages (i.e.,
restriction percentages) by region. Utilities in Northern California are mostly in tiers 2, 3,
and 4 of the SWRCB conservation program with a weighted average restriction of 16.2%.
Utilities in Southern California are in higher tiers (6, 7, 8, and 9) with a weighted average
restriction of 22.5%.

2.4.2 Estimated welfare losses forecasted under perfect compliance
In Table 2-5 we present estimates of average forecasted welfare losses per acre-foot of
restriction under perfect compliance with a uniform restriction (25%) and the SWRCB
conservation program. The average welfare loss per acre-foot due to a uniform 25%
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restriction is $5,094, which represents an aggregate loss for the metropolitan regions of
Northern and Southern California of $1.20 billion. Under the SWRCB conservation
program, the average welfare loss per acre-foot is $3,846, which represents an aggregate
loss of $875 million. For these two metropolitan regions, we observe lower aggregate
welfare losses under the SWRCB conservation program than under a uniform restriction
policy. However, these figures are difficult to compare since, in consumption terms, the
SWRCB conservation program is less than a 25% restriction, at least for those utilities in
the study sample. This is because utilities outside of the metropolitan regions we
considered were generally assigned percentage restrictions through the SWRCB
conservation program that were greater than 25%. For the utilities included in our
analysis, total water saved by single-family households, assuming perfect compliance, is
373,000 acre-feet under the 25% uniform restriction, but only 336,000 acre-feet under the
SWRCB conservation program. The aggregate percentage restriction from the SWRCB
conservation program is just under 20% in the urban areas under study.
Next, we assess efficiency advantages of these policies and evaluate important
regional differences in the relative incidence of losses under each policy. Table 2-5
presents the results of forecasted welfare loss calculations for Northern and Southern
California under perfect compliance with a uniform 25% restriction and the SWRCB
conservation program. In Northern California, forecasted welfare losses are estimated to
be $182 million under a 25% uniform restriction and $106 million under the SWRCB
conservation program. In Southern California, forecasted welfare losses are estimated to
be $1.01 billion under a 25% uniform restriction and $769 million under the SWRCB
conservation program. Larger total losses in Southern California relative to Northern
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California are due to the larger population. In Northern California, a comparison of the
uniform restriction (25%) and the SWRCB conservation program indicates average
welfare losses per acre-foot of $6,726 and $6,107, respectively. In Southern California,
average welfare loss per acre-foot of restriction is $2,832 under the 25% uniform
restriction and $2,757 under the SWRCB conservation program.
However, to effectively evaluate efficiency, we require a different comparison for
Northern and Southern California since, under the SWRCB conservation program,
Northern and Southern California would reduce residential urban consumption by less
than 25%. To this end, Column (3) of Table 2-5 presents welfare analysis corresponding
to a hypothetical uniform restriction policy that achieves the same level of cutbacks as the
SWRCB conservation program for each of the regions: Northern California (16.2%
overall restriction) and Southern California (22.5% overall restriction). In Northern
California, the average welfare loss per-acre foot under a uniform restriction of 16.2% is
$3,983. In Southern California, the average welfare loss per-acre foot under a uniform
restriction of 22.5% is $2,654. In both cases, average losses are lower under the adjusted
uniform restriction compared to the SWRCB conservation program. This finding is
surprising because uniform restrictions on service areas with heterogeneous elasticities
tend to be inefficient. The utility-specific restrictions under the SWRCB conservation
program were not assigned according to an efficient allocation scheme.
Besides inefficiency, another argument against a uniform percentage restriction is
inequity. Under the SWRCB program, restrictions are monotonically increasing
according to baseline consumption, which works to tighten the distribution of household
level consumption across service areas. Further, there is a strong positive relationship
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between consumption in the residential sector and household income; thus, cut-backs are
generally larger under the SWRCB conservation program for households in wealthier
services areas (e.g., Hillsborough in Northern California and Beverly Hills in Southern
California) than for households in poorer service areas. Therefore, by its very
construction, the SWRCB program is more equitable than a uniform cut-back.
The second and fourth rows of Table 2-5 indicate the 95% confidence interval for each
estimate. These confidence intervals reflect the estimated variability in the price elasticities
of demand recovered from the regression analysis. Due to the non-linearity of price
elasticity in the expression of welfare losses, confidence intervals for welfare estimates are
bootstrapped by cluster (urban water utility), they are not based on analytic standard errors.
Our data also provides some insight into the magnitude of estimated welfare
effects in terms of implied household WTP measures. The fifth row of each panel
illustrates the average household’s WTP under each scenario. Estimated monthly WTP
per household to avoid the 25% restriction is $42 in Northern California and $34 in
Southern California, while under the SWRCB conservation program, households
estimated monthly WTP is $24 in Northern California and $26 in Southern California.
Consistent with previous results, the higher WTP to avoid the uniform 25% cut-back
demonstrates that households find the 25% uniform cut-back more harmful than the
SWRCB conservation program. Again, this is driven by the fact that the SWRCB
conservation program conserves less water in the urban areas included in this study. The
third column displays the WTP to avoid a uniform policy achieving the same aggregate
water reduction as the SWRCB conservation program. We observe that the average
household WTP to avoid such a uniform percentage cut-back is less than the WTP to
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avoid the SWRCB conservation program. Overall, these households’ WTP measures are
not as large as some might fear, though they are sizeable when compared to baseline
household water expenditures.
The last row of both panels illustrates households’ WTP measure regarding the
percentage increase in expenditures on the volumetric rate component of the households’
monthly water bills. Households in Northern California have a WTP in terms of increase
in monthly water bills between 28% and 75%, depending on the scenario. Households in
Southern California have a WTP regarding percentage increase in the monthly bills
between 31% and 41%.
Table 2-6’s presentation of average outcomes for large metropolitan areas masks the
high degree of variation within the Northern and Southern California regions. Figure 2-4
illustrates the heterogeneity in average welfare loss per acre-foot of restriction for urban
water utilities within each region. We observe average welfare losses per acre-foot
ranging from approximately $800 to $15,000. Relative to Southern California, the
distribution in Northern California is shifted to the right and is more disperse. This figure
reflects that households have more inelastic demand in the San Francisco Bay Area than
in Southern California. Further, the wider range of average welfare losses per acre-foot of
restriction in the San Francisco Bay Area reflects its greater variability in incomes, which
coincides with household landscaping choices in the region. When comparing these
distributions of average welfare losses for a uniform restriction versus utility-specific
restrictions, we observe somewhat contrasting patterns in Northern versus Southern
California. In Northern California, the distribution of average welfare losses for the
uniform restriction is flatter than and shifted to the right of the distribution for the utility-
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specific restrictions, while in Southern California, the distribution for the uniform
restriction has more mass to the left and a smaller right tail than the distribution for the
utility-specific restrictions. The distributions of average welfare losses for both Northern
and Southern California provide visual evidence that there is significant heterogeneity in
welfare impacts across the state.
Overall, the anticipated welfare losses under perfect compliance with the SWRCB
conservation program suggest aggregate losses of $106 million for the 27 agencies we
consider in Northern California and $769 million for the 26 agencies we consider in
Southern California.

2.4.3 Actual welfare losses under observed imperfect compliance
We calculate actual welfare losses, based on imperfect compliance with the SWRCB
conservation program since some utilities did not meet their conservation standard, while
others exceeded them. Tables 2-6 and 2-7 present estimated average monthly R-GPCD6
for both June-February 2013 and the mandate period (June 2015 to February 2016), by
the utility. These tables also present both the mandated percentage cut-back and the
observed percentage cut-back.7 The final two columns in the tables compare predicted
average welfare losses under perfect compliance with the SWRCB conservation program
and estimates of actual average welfare losses observed under imperfect compliance with
the SWRCB conservation program.
The numbers in the first two columns of both tables 2-6 and 2-7 confirm that average

6

R-GPCD= Residential Gallons per Capita Day.
For more information visit:
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/conservation_portal/conservation
_reporting.shtml
7
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consumption decreased in the mandate period for all of the utilities in Northern and
Southern California, compared to the base year 2013. However, the magnitudes and
spatial distribution of actual reductions are not consistent with the SWRCB conservation
program. For example, the SWRCB conservation program imposed a 32% restriction on
Beverly Hills, but they only achieved a 19% reduction in water consumption.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2-6 summarize the restrictions from the SWRCB
conservation program, and the corresponding observed percentage reductions relative to
2013, for utilities in Northern California. Recorded consumption for utilities in Northern
California (with reported data) shows that 23 of 24 utilities considered actually exceeded
the required consumption cut-backs. California Water Service-Bear Gulch is the only
utility that did not to meet its cut-back standard, though the target was only missed by
one percentage point. On average, utilities in Northern California reduced water usage by
seven percentage points more than was required by the SWRCB conservation program.
The same columns in Table 2-7 show these restrictions and observed percentage
reductions for utilities in Southern California. Compared to the results from Northern
California, only 8 of 25 utilities met their conservation standard, and 9 of the 17 utilities
that missed their standards did so by more than 5 percentage points. Overall, Table 2-7
demonstrates a mismatch in the spatial distribution of assigned versus observed cut-backs
in Southern California.8 For example, while Beverly Hills missed their conservation
target, San Diego exceeded their target of 16%, achieving a 19% reduction. On average,

8

In the case of wholesale utilities, such as many of the utilities belonging to MWD, no
single observed reduction exists because they sell their water to multiple local utilities
who have their own reductions. Thus, for each wholesale utility, we collected observed
reduction information on every single local utility within the wholesale utility, and a
household-weighted average reduction was calculated.
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utilities in Southern California reduced their water usage by approximately three
percentage points less than what was required by the SWRCB conservation program.
The difference in compliance between Northern and Southern California is striking,
though it is difficult to attribute to a single factor. A natural driver of compliance may be
the value of restricted water units. For example, Beverly Hills’ anticipated average
welfare loss per acre-foot due to their mandated 32% restriction would be over $11,000
per acre-foot. Thus, their incentive to comply was considerably less than other utilities in
Southern California (the majority of utilities had anticipated average welfare losses per
acre-foot below $3,000). However, other utilities with anticipated average welfare losses
above $11,000 per acre-foot managed to comply with the mandate. Another important
feature of the SWRCB conservation program was that individual utilities were charged
with determining how mandated conservation targets would be met. For instance, the
City of Hillsborough, which had large anticipated average welfare losses, imposed
stringent prohibitions on certain categories of water-use. Wichman (2016) showed that
prohibitions on categories of water-use (e.g., landscape irrigation) result in larger
reductions than other conservation strategies (e.g., conservation pricing), especially
among high income, high volume users. Wichman’s results on conservation pricing are
consistent with the residential [isoelastic] demand estimation presented in the previous
section showing that high-income households are more inelastic. A general takeaway
from Wichman, Taylor, and Von Haefen (2016) is that conservation response will depend
on a utility’s conservation strategy; thus, differences in compliance may be attributed to
each utility’s method for achieving the SWRCB conservation standards. While individual
utilities under the SWRCB conservation plan are given flexibility regarding how to meet
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assigned conservation standards, the SWRCB program also defined a $10,000 a day fine
on water utilities for not meeting the assigned targets. Thus, income levels and the size of
the customer base for a utility’s service area could also affect compliance, since highincome communities with a sizable customer base may not be responsive to fines
assessed at the utility level.
Utility-level conservation encouragement may also explain the pattern of compliance
across California, although encouragement could affect compliance through distinct
channels. A common form of conservation encouragement is to offer rebates for water
efficient appliances. At the state-level, the California Energy Commission has offered
rebate programs to replace inefficient showerheads, faucet heads, older appliances with
newer, water-efficient models, and water-intensive lawns with turf or brownscaping
(SWRCB, 2015). In addition to state programs, many urban water utilities support
participation in state-sponsored programs or augment the state programs with local rebate
offers. Historical participation in rebate programs may lead to demand hardening; after
initial conservation efforts, there may be few margins on which to further reduce
consumption. This highlights the fact that the base year of 2013 that was used to
determine utility-specific conservation standards is an arbitrary base period which
penalized utilities that achieved significant conservation in the years immediately before
2013 (or favored microclimatic regions that had an unseasonably dry, warm year in
2013). For these reasons, historical conservation may partially explain compliance.
Participation in rebate programming in response to the mandate, or in the years
immediately preceding it (but after the base year of 2013), would support compliance
with restrictions. For example, city utilities, such as Menlo Park in Northern California,
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had attractive rebate programs during the mandate period for lawn replacement and
offered a subsidized consultation on how to design drought-tolerant landscaping.
Naturally, these types of recent conservation efforts at the utility level may also explain
the pattern of compliance across utilities.
A separate channel through which encouragement may explain compliance with the
SWRCB conservation standards is moral suasion through conservation messaging and
local social norms. Hollis (2016) documents how urban water consumption covaries over
time during MWD’s multi-faceted conservation messaging program, which uses roadside
billboards and freeway signs, radio messages, and TV advertisements. Other water
conservation messaging includes a host of interviews, op-ed pieces, news stories and
public service messages. In addition to the MWD, urban water utilities conducted their
public information campaigns—8 of 10 Southern Californians reported having recently
heard conservation-related messages (Hollis, 2016). Evidence on the effectiveness of
such conservation messaging is mixed and may depend on factors such as local greenness. Therefore, differential responses to conservation messaging in Northern and
Southern California may also explain the divergence in compliance with the SWRCB’s
conservation program.
Another potential determinant of compliance is water supply storage. In Southern
California, utilities have made significant investments in storage. For example, when the
mandated restrictions were announced in the year 2015, MWD had approximately one
million acre-feet of dry-year storage, a significant amount to report after three years of
intense drought. To put this in perspective, MWD generally provides less than two
million acre-feet of water annually; thus, their dry-year reserves at the end of a three-year
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drought were capable of servicing over half of their historical annual demand quantity.
While protecting dry-year storage supplies is an important consideration, utilities in
Southern California may have determined that they have sufficient storage to weather the
drought without enforcing the SWRCB conservation program restrictions.
While the pattern of compliance seems somewhat unexpected, one simple observation
is worth pointing out. The mandated restrictions in Northern California compared to
Southern California were significantly less in both percentage terms (16.2% versus
22.5% reduction) and absolute terms (12 R-GPCD versus 24 R-GPCD reductions). Given
these facts alone, we might anticipate more compliance in Northern California, though
there are likely other drivers.
We conclude this section by presenting welfare loss results under observed imperfect
compliance, as opposed to hypothetical perfect compliance, with mandated restrictions.
In the Northern California region, estimates of average welfare losses per acre-foot from
actual reductions over the course of the mandate range from $2,702 to $15,710. In the
Southern California region, estimates of welfare losses from actual reductions range from
$890 to $7,349. The difference between average welfare losses calculated from estimates
of actual reductions in Northern and Southern California ($7,375 - $2,537 = $4,838) is
considerably larger than the difference between the predicted average welfare losses
calculated assuming perfect compliance ($4,717 - $2,974 = $1,743). This makes sense
since utilities in Northern California, which have more inelastic demands than utilities in
Southern California, tended to exceed their conservation standards, while those in
Southern California tended to miss their standards.
Putting these numbers in perspective, the per household, per month results suggest
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that households in Northern California would have been willing to pay between $12 and
$468 per month to avoid the conservation efforts that were actually implemented in
response to the mandate; the median household would have been willing to pay $39 per
month. In Southern California, the results suggest that households would have been
willing to pay between $5 and $177 per month to avoid the conservation efforts they
implemented in response to the mandate and the median household would have been
willing to pay $26 per month. Residential water demand in Northern California tends to
be more inelastic than in Southern California, resulting in higher welfare losses for a
given percentage reduction in water use.

2.5 Concluding Remarks
Californians experienced a severe drought between late 2011 through early 2017, perhaps
the worst in California’s history regarding its economic impacts on urban users.
According to the U.S. Drought Monitor, more than 50% of the state was in an “extreme”
drought event with more than 30% in an “exceptional” drought event.9 This drought has
had a widespread, but unevenly distributed, impact on different sectors and water users,
including farmers, industry, cities, and natural ecosystems that depend on water quantity,
quality, and timing of flows (Gleick 2016).10 To mitigate the adverse impacts of drought,
in April 2015 Governor Jerry Brown issued an executive order mandating statewide
reductions in water use by 25% in urban areas, which generally targeted residential
water-use. We calculate one component of the mandate’s impacts by assessing its effect
9

For more information, see:
http://droughtmonitor.unl.edu/Home/StateDroughtMonitor.aspx?CA.
10
For more detail information about 1987-1992 drought consequences see Gleick and Nash
1991; and Nash 1993, the 2007-2009 drought see Christian-Smith et al. 2011, and the
current 2012-2015 drought see Cooley et al. 2015; and Gleick 2015.
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on residential ratepayers in urban areas of Northern and Southern California.
We construct a utility-level panel of monthly consumption data from 2004-2009
for 111 utilities to estimate residential urban water demand. The demand estimation
results provide price elasticities that are used to calculate the welfare consequences of the
2015 drought mandate. Estimated elasticities for the sample utilities in Northern
California are between -0.32 and -0.1; for the sample utilities in Southern California,
estimated elasticities are between -0.50 and -0.1. Our empirical results indicate
significant variation in the value of water across urban space.
Two different policy options were defined and analyzed to estimate welfare losses
experienced due to water restrictions, including (i) a 25% uniform cut-back across
utilities during the mandate period (June 2015- February 2016), and (ii) utility-specific
cut-backs based on the SWRCB program during the same mandate period. According to
the estimated results, welfare losses per acre-foot are lowest under the SWRCB
conservation program in Southern California and highest under the 25% uniform cutback in Northern California. We also calculate welfare results for a uniform restriction
that achieves the same aggregate level of rationing as the SWRCB conservation program.
This uniform policy is more efficient than the utility-specific restrictions imposed by the
SWRCB conservation program. These results suggest that the SWRCB conservation
program targets equity, rather than efficiency. Further, the efficiency losses are not so
substantial, relative to the uniform policy. Based on the work of Buck et al. (2016), an
efficient allocation of restrictions across utilities based on the marginal value of water for
the last unit restricted, would not likely yield significant efficiency gains.
The aggregate cost of the governor’s mandate in terms of lost consumer welfare is an
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estimated $875 million. The cost to implement the water conservation mandate is $106
million in the San Francisco Bay area and $769 million in Southern California. In other
words, Northern California households have a WTP of $24 per month to avoid the
conservation mandate. Put differently; these households are willing to see an increase in
their water rates of 44% to avoid the conservation requirements. Households in Southern
California have a WTP of $26 per month to avoid this mandate; they are willing to see a
31% increase in their water rate to avoid the mandated cutbacks.
The pattern of compliance with the SWRCB’s conservation program presents a
puzzle. The data indicate that Northern and Southern California households reduced their
water usage by a similar percentage: 23.3% in the Bay Area of Northern California and
21.4% in Southern California. However, conservation targets in the Bay Area were
significantly lower than in Southern California in both absolute and percentage terms. On
average, consumers in Northern California over-complied with the conservation mandate,
while those in Southern California slightly under-complied. Future research may help to
better explain patterns of actual conservation during a drought and may shed light on
whether the state was justified in setting such different percentage conservation targets
for consumers in different regions.

33

2.6 Figures and Tables

Figure 2-1 Prices Per Acre-Foot by Utility in the Northern and Southern California
Notes: Vertical axis in this figure shows the share of utilities in a given price bin. For
example, approximately 50% of utilities in Southern California are in $1,000-$1,500 price
bin. However, only 8% of utilities in Northern California are in the same price bin. It is
noted that 27 utilities are used from Northern California; 26 utilities are from Southern.
Mean, minimum, and maximum price per acre-foot in Northern California utilities are
$2,513, $1,446, and, $4,217, respectively. These summary statistics for Southern
California utilities are $1,526, $674, and $2,943, respectively.
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Figure 2-2 Distribution of Estimated Price Elasticity of Water Demand by Region
Notes: Elasticities are based on results reported in Column (5) of Table 2-3. The mean,
minimum and maximum estimated price elasticities in Northern California utilities are 0.16, -0.32, and -0.1; in Southern California utilities are -0.29, -0.50, and -0.1. Estimated
price elasticities are truncated at -0.1.
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Figure 2-3 Distribution of Mandated Conservation Across Utilities in Northern and
Southern California
Notes: Vertical axis in this figure shows percentage share of utilities in a given mandatory
conservation standard bin. For example, approximately 40% of utilities in Northern
California are required to conserve less than 10%. However, only approximately 4% of
utilities in Southern California are required to conserve the same amount. The vertical
dashed line indicates average mandatory cut-back in the sample utilities. Utilities in the
Northern California (27 utilities) were required to cut-back water usage by 16.2%.
Minimum and maximum cut-back for these utilities respectively are 8% and 36%. Utilities
in the Southern California (26 utilities) were required to cut-back water usage by 22.5%.
Minimum and maximum cutbacks for these utilities respectively are 8% and 36%.

36

Figure 2-4 Heterogeneity in Welfare Losses for Urban Water Utilities Located in
Northern and Southern California.
Notes: For the study sample, utility-specific restrictions result in an overall cutback of
16.2% in Northern California and 22.5% in Southern California. Per acre-foot welfare loss
under 25% uniform restriction lies between $3,318 and $12,926 in Northern California.
For southern California, this number lies between $883 and $9,569. Under utility-specific
restrictions per acre-foot welfare loss in Northern California lies between $2,111 and
$15,028 and in Southern California, this range is between $859 and $11,808.
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Table 2-1 Urban Water Utilities Conservation Tiers and Count of the Utilities in each
Tier
Tier
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

R-GPCD Range
From
0
65
80
95
110
130
170
215

# of Suppliers
in Range

To
64.99
79.99
94.99
109.99
129.99
169.99
214.99
612.00

Conservation Standard
4
27
23
42
61
45
81
61
67

Notes: The mandate aim is to reduce the amount of water consumed statewide in urban
areas by 25% relative to 2013 levels – roughly 1.3 million acre-foot of water. A total of
411 urban water utilities are required to reduce water supply (sum of Column (4) in Table
2-1).
R-GPCD: Residential Gallons Per Capita Day
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4%
8%
12%
16%
20%
24%
28%
32%
36%

Table 2-2 Average Monthly Household Water Consumption In 2009 From Regression
Dataset (Unit: CCF/Month)
Region
Total utilities
in the sample

Variable
Average
monthly
Arid season

Mean S.D.

Min.

Max.

17.50 8.40

4.06

52.87

23.40 11.57

0.43

68.95

Wet season

17.58 8.73

0.25

69.51

11.98 7.97

4.063 52.87

16.55 10.41

0.44

66.02

11.72 6.27

0.25

52.87

19.07 7.83

7.74

52.80

25.30 11.16

4.73

68.95

19.17 8.61

2.88

69.51

Average
Sample utilities in monthly
the
Arid season
Northern California
Wet season
Average
Sample utilities in monthly
the
Arid season
Southern California
Wet season

Notes: Average monthly household water consumption on a CCF basis lies between 5 to
15 CCF in Northern California and between 12 and 25 in Southern California.
CCF: hundred cubic feet
S.D: Standard deviation
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Table 2-3 Monthly Residential Water Demand Estimation

Ln(Price)

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.198**
(0.0992)

-0.207**
(0.100)

-0.23*
(0.105)

-

-

-

-

0.458*
(0.268)

4,176
0.021

4,176
0.543

4,104
0.543

468
0.282

4,104
0.543

Yes
Yes
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Ln(Price) X Ln(Income)
Observations
R-squared
Year Fixed Effects (Y=6)
Utility Fixed Effects (U=111)
Weather Controls
Month Fixed Effects (M=9)
County Specific t, t2 (C=9)

(4)

(5)

-0.184* -2.100**
(0.103) (1.087)

Notes: Huber-White standard errors estimated using the Huber-White method and reported
in parentheses; multi-way clustered standard errors are approximately the same as HuberWhite standard errors. Multi-way clustered standard errors are clustered by year and utility.
Implied price elasticity using Column (5) specification indicates that own price elasticity
in an urban water utility with a median household income of $65,000 would be -0.19. Note
that $65,000 is the weighted median income by using an average number of households in
each utility service area as a weight.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.

40

Table 2-4 Average Forecasted Welfare Losses Per Acre-Foot of Restriction by Scenario
Average
welfare loss
per acre-foot

Scenario

Scenario 1: Uniform restriction (25%)

Scenario 2: Utility-specific restrictions
(State Water Resources Control Board
Conservation Program)

$5,094
[$3,138]

$3,846
[$3,004]

Notes: The standard deviation for mean welfare losses per acre-foot across 53 urban water
utilities is reported in square brackets. The numbers reported in the square brackets are not
standard errors; instead, they are the standard deviations associated with the calculation of
mean welfare loss per acre-foot for the 53 urban water utilities. Marginal loss per acre-foot
is truncated at $20,000.
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Table 2-5 Welfare Losses Under Uniform Restriction (25%) and Utility-Specific
Restrictions from the SWRCB Conservation Program
Panel A: Northern California Utilities
Policy restriction scenario:

Uniform Restriction
(25%)

Total loss ($ millions)
$182
[95% Bootstrapped C.I.]
[$160-$230]
Average loss ($/AF)
$6,726
[95% Bootstrapped C.I.]
[$5,914-$8,471]
Household WTP($/Month)
42
*
% increases in
75
expenditures*
Panel B: Southern California Utilities

Utility-specific
Restrictions
(resulting overall
cut-back of 16.2%)

Uniform Restriction
(16.2%)

$106
[$100-$109]
$6,107
[$5,773-$6,263]

$69
43[$56-$80]
$3,983
[$3,238-$4,626]

24

16

44

28

Utility-specific
Uniform Restriction
Uniform Restriction
Restrictions
(22.5%)
Policy restriction scenario:
(25%)
(resulting overall
cut-back of 22.5%)
Total loss ($ millions)
$1,010
$769
$872
[95% Bootstrapped C.I.]
[$759-$2,098]
[$600-$1,435]
[$668-$1,685]
Average loss ($/AF)
$2,832
$2,757
$2,654
[95% Bootstrapped C.I.]
[$2,126-$5,875]
[$2,154-$5,150]
[$2,032-$5,128]
Household WTP($/month)
34
26
29
% increases in expenditures
41
31
36
Notes: For Northern California Utilities in the panel the quantity-weighted average price is
$2,236 ($/AF), the household-weighted average price elasticity of demand is -0.17, total
residential demand from June-February in 2013 is 108,457 (AF), and a total number of
single-family residential households is 485,892. In Southern California Utilities the
quantity-weighted average price is $1,709 ($/AF), the household-weighted average
elasticity is -0.29, total residential demand from June-February is 1,428,380 (AF), and a
total number of single-family residential households is 3,314,653. Square brackets report
95% confidence intervals for estimates of total welfare losses and average welfare losses
per acre-foot of supply restriction. Because the elasticity estimates enter non-linearly into
the welfare expression, these are bootstrapped confidence intervals with bootstrapping
clustered at water utility level. The household WTP measure divides the total loss reported
in the first row by the total number of single-family residential households in the region.
The % increase in expenditures uses the welfare loss estimates to calculate how much
households would be willing to increase their existing expenditures in percentage terms to
avoid the percent restriction identified at the top of the corresponding column. WTP and
percentage increases in expenditures are calculated only for the single-family residential
sector. Marginal losses are truncated at $20,000.
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Table 2-6 Average Predicted and Actual Welfare Losses ($/AF) in Northern California

Estimated
average RGPCD11,12
(y2013)
49
57
67
90
48
NA
79
63
109
73
58
77
61
97
56
81
55
80
79
69
83
96
105
174
260
74.2

Estimated
average RGPCD13
(y2015)
40
44
57
65
41
59
62
48
65
56
44
57
54
70
43
56
42
61
56
54
59
70
75
113
148
57.0

Mandatory
restriction
relative to
y2013 (%)
8%
8%
12%
16%
8%
12%
16%
8%
16%
8%
8%
16%
8%
20%
8%
16%
8%
16%
16%
8%
16%
20%
24%
36%
36%
16.2%

Observed
reduction
relative to
y2013 (%)
20%
24%
15%
28%
15%
NA
22%
23%
42%
24%
26%
26%
12%
28%
24%
31%
24%
23%
28%
21%
29%
26%
31%
35%
42%
23.3%

Predicted
welfare
loss
($/AF)
2,111
2,320
2,322
2,574
2,730
2,731
2,973
3,016
3,120
3,268
3,584
3,683
3,689
3,709
3,752
3,893
4,073
4,075
4,648
4,924
7,263
7,441
9,277
11,729
15,028
4,717

Northern California
CWS So. SF
East Palo Alto
Estero MID
Alameda CWD
SFPUC
Milpitas*
Santa Clara
Hayward
Menlo Park MWD
Redwood
Westborough
CWS Mid-Peninsula
Daly City
San Jose MWS
San Bruno
Mountain View
North Coast CWD
Millbrae
Sunnyvale
Coastside CWD
Burlingame
Mid-Peninsula
Palo Alto
CWS Bear Gulch
Hillsborough
Average
Aggregate Welfare
129
Loss ($ millions)
Notes: Utilities that exceed the mandatory conservation requirement are indicated with
italics. MID = Municipal Improvement District; CWD = County Water District; MWD =
Metropolitan Water District; CWS = California Water Service. * indicates no data
available. Brisbane and Purissima Hills are not required to cut-back. All welfare loss
calculations capped marginal welfare loss per acre-foot at $20,000.
11 R-GPCD= Residential Gallons Per Capita Day.
12 Monthly R-GPCD for 9-month (June-February) of 2013 is calculated using monthly RGPCD and
monthly percent saved data which is publicly available on the State Water Resources Control Board
(SWRCB) website.
13 The SWRCB monthly R-GPCD data is averaged over the period of June 2015 and February 2016.
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Actual
welfare
loss
($/AF)
2,998
3,248
2,702
4,887
3,232
2,731
4,047
4,262
10,938
7,380
10,328
6,564
4,191
6,455
6,508
8,642
8,786
5,789
9,675
9,861
12,284
10,022
11,703
11,432
15,710
7,375
265

Table 2-7 Average Predicted and Actual Welfare Losses ($/AF) in Southern California.

Southern California

Burbank
Compton
Anaheim
Long Beach
USGV MWD*
Santa Ana
San Fernando
Glendale
Fullerton
IEUA*
Central Basin MWD*
Eastern MWD
Western MWD*
Pasadena
Three Valleys MWD*
MWD Orange County*
Torrance
West Basin MWD*
San Diego CWA*
Santa Monica
Calleguas MWD*
Los Angeles
Foothill MWD*
Las Virgenes MWD
Beverly Hills

Estimated
average RGPCD14,15
(y2013)

Estimated
average RGPCD16
(y2015)

Mandatory
restriction
relative to
y2013 (%)

Observed
reduction
relative to
y2013 (%)

Predicted
welfare
loss ($)

Actual
welfare
loss ($)

117
61
96
74
119
71
108
102
116
131
64
112
150
123
121
106
98
121
106
90
141
85
214
211
178

87
54
75
63
92
79
86
80
93
100
52
92
115
99
96
82
77
98
80
71
103
72
160
155
144

24%
8%
20%
16%
32%
12%
24%
20%
28%
28%
16%
28%
32%
28%
28%
24%
20%
20%
16%
20%
21%
16%
24%
36%
32%

25%
12%
22%
15%
27%
17%
20%
21%
20%
23%
18%
18%
23%
21%
24%
23%
20%
15%
19%
21%
20%
16%
26%
29%
19%

859
1,170
1,292
1,302
1,353
1,407
1,422
1,655
1,738
1,757
2,050
2,080
2,223
2,262
2,408
2,451
2,761
2,845
3,087
3,433
3,433
3,515
6,121
9,914
11,808

890
1,235
1,356
1,284
1,273
1,531
1,330
1,701
1,376
1,534
2,087
1,722
1,781
1,910
2,049
2,380
2,761
2,454
3,177
3,498
3,313
3,496
5,300
7,349
6,638

Average
107.4
84.4
22.5%
21.4%
2,974
2,537
Aggregate Welfare
916
794
Loss ($ millions)
Notes: Utilities that exceed the mandatory conservation requirement are indicated with italics.
MWD = Metropolitan Water District; IEUA = Inland Empire Utilities Agency; USGV = Upper
San Gabriel Valley; * For each wholesale utility we collect required information on every local
utility within the wholesale utility and calculate an average. San Marino is not required to reduce
consumption. All welfare loss calculations cap marginal welfare loss per acre-foot at $20,000.
14 R-GPCD= Residential Gallons Per Capita Day.
15 R-GPCD for 9-month (June-February) of 2013 is calculated using monthly RGPCD and monthly percent saved data
which is publicly available on the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) website.
16 The SWRCB monthly R-GPCD data is averaged over the period of June 2015 and February 2016.
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Chapter 3. HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF REAL-TIME CONSUMPTION
ANALYTICS ON RESIDENTIAL WATER CONSUMPTION

Abstract
This paper estimates how web-based Home Water Use Reports (HWURs)
affect household-level water consumption in Folsom City, California. The HWURs under
study, offered by the company Dropcountr (DC), share social comparisons, consumption
analytics, and conservation information to residential accounts, primarily through digital
communications. The data utilized in this paper is a daily panel tracking single-family
residential households from January-2013 to May-2017. We found that there is a 7.8%
reduction in average daily household water consumption for a typical household who
enrolled in DC program. Results suggest that the effect of DC varies by the baseline
consumption quintile, the number of months in the program, the day of the week, quartile
of the year, message type, and enrollment wave. We also conduct empirical tests to
evaluate the channels through which DC may act to reduce consumption. Results indicate
these responses to DC program likely come from the information channel rather than
moral suasion. Furthermore, our results indicate that providing consumption and pricing
information may not improve the effectiveness of non-linear pricing.
Keywords: Automated meters, Non-price conservation, Social-norms, Urban water
demand, moral suasion, marginal pricing
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3.1 Introduction
Public utilities in arid regions struggle to balance supply and demand of water resources
both in the short-term and long-term. Most of California's water suppliers in 2015, for
example, were required to reduce water use to achieve a 25 percent mandatory reduction
level17. In addition to these short-term policies, water suppliers are required to comply
with longer-term policies, such as the California Water Action Plan(CWAP)18.
Specifically, the CWAP provides strategies for enhancing water use efficiency and
conservation. One of its objectives is to “strengthen water conservation programs to a
level comparable to those of energy utilities.” In addition to CWAP, California's 20x2020
Water Conservation Plan of 200819 requires utilities to make 20 percent reductions in
water use by 2020. The primary reason for consideration of conservation is financial;
conservation reduces water consumption in a cost-effective and less politically sensitive
manner than developing new supplies or reallocating from agriculture to the urban sector
(Kenney 2014, Kenney, Mazzone, and Bedingfield 2010).
Utilities use a variety of tools to meet conservation goals-- including price
adjustments, outdoor water use restrictions, and efficient appliances rebate programs
(Olmstead 2010). Relying on price adjustments to reduce household water demand results
in uncertainty in revenue forecasting for utilities and stirs political rancor due to equity
concerns for this essential good. Rebate programs may not be cost-effective (Bennear et
al. 2013, Brent, Cook, and Olsen 2015) and water use restrictions are costly. For instance,

17

http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/drought/docs/04011
5_executive_order.pdf
18
http://resources.ca.gov/california_water_action_plan
19
http://www.water.ca.gov/wateruseefficiency/sb7/docs/20x2020plan.pdf
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Buck, Nemati, and Sunding (2016b) find that California’s mandatory restriction in 20152016, resulted in economic losses of over $1 billion and cost households an average of
$25 per month.
The most appealing non-pecuniary conservation programs are “social-normbased” ones. These programs seek to alter households' decisions by providing
consumption information -- which often includes the households' consumption behavior
and comparison to their neighbors. Although there is limited academic evidence available
as to whether these programs cost-effectively reduce water consumption, initial research
suggests significant potential. Moreover, debate persists in the academic literature as to
the significance of and the type of (average versus marginal) price effects on
consumption decisions. Generating frequent and highly granular micro-level household
data through partnerships between a digital social comparison product and water service
providers will improve academic and policy-maker information around decision-making
over residential water demand management programming. Well-designed experiments
and partnerships have the potential to reduce consumption, while also providing more
precise estimates about how various price and non-price management tools, as well as
household characteristics, determine water consumption. Additionally, such information
could be leveraged not only to direct more effective and efficient water management
strategies but also to enable improved forecasting of future water demand, which is
necessary for determining optimal state and regional regulatory and infrastructure
choices. Hence, this type of research is important in developing solutions to water
resource challenges that are impactful, cost-effective, and efficient.
This paper will contribute to a substantial body of similar research in the energy sector
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and growing but less advanced work in social comparison programs for the water sector.
Experimental designs in numerous markets with Opower, an information sharing, and
social comparison tool used in residential electricity management programming, have
allowed for a multitude of research questions to be explored on residential energy
consumption. In general, these findings show an economically and statistically
significant average treatment effect, with evidence of heterogeneous impacts and
advantages over other programs in reducing energy consumption in a cost-effective
manner (Allcott 2011, Allcott and Rogers 2014, Allcott and Taubinsky 2015, Ayres,
Raseman, and Shih 2013, Costa and Kahn 2013). Other social norm-based programs in
the electricity sector also found similar results (Pellerano et al. 2017). Limited academic
analysis has been generated in the water sector, however; the authors are aware of only a
few analyses published in peer-reviewed academic journals, which examined the effect of
WaterSmart services in three Californian utilities (Brent, Cook, and Olsen 2015), a single
program in Cobb County, Georgia (Bernedo, Ferraro, and Price 2014, Ferraro and
Miranda 2013, Ferraro, Miranda, and Price 2011, Ferraro and Price 2013), and a program
in San Diego (Schultz et al. 2014). Shortly, we discuss results of all these experiments—
including Opower, WaterSmart, and Cobb County- in greater detail.
In this paper, we examine the effect of a social-norm-based conservation program
on households' water usage. The program under study is administered by Dropcountr
(DC), a mobile and web application that informs customers of their water consumption,
relative to their neighbors. Specifically, DC provides (i) current water usage, (ii) a
comparison to previous usage, (iii) comparison to similar nearby households, and (iv) the
efficient budget for households. Also, it also provides tips about where households can
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save water and connects them to existing water utility rebate programs on water saving
appliances. DC also monitors households' hourly water usage data to identify possible
leaks in their water system. They use unexpected boosts in water consumption as a signal
of a leak in the households' water system and send an email message or phone alert to the
customer. Hence, DC is designed to motivate households to reduce their water use by
changing their behavior, adopting water efficient technologies or finding leaks. DC
differs from other similar programs in the water sector because of their emphasis on
leveraging digital communication platforms, rather than paper reports, which allows for
greater flexibility in message content and more frequent and varied content. Also, the DC
platform is connected to the households' Smart meter. This option allows DC to provide
real-time information to customers.
We analyze the effect of DC program on water consumption in the City of
Folsom, CA. The data utilized for this analysis includes two years of historical daily
consumption, along with 29 months of data under the DC pilot program, spanning
January 2013 through May 2017. DC designed this program as an opt-in program.
Therefore, analysis of a treatment effect is challenged by this non-experimental design.
However, various statistical tools will be explored to minimize the challenges of
interpreting results.
To preview the results, we find evidence that DC has a statistically and
economically significant conserving effect on water consumption at the household level
for customers who enrolled in the service. The estimated Average Treatment Effect
Under Treated (ATOT) is a 7.8% reduction in daily consumption. Given the overall price
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elasticity for the single-family residential sector is around -0.2320, 7.8% reduction in daily
consumption is comparable to an almost 34% increases in prices. There appears to be a
stronger effect for those households identified as high-water consumers in the summer of
the baseline period. This paper also finds evidence of a “boomerang effect”' (i.e., an
increase in average water use) for those households in the lower portion of baseline
distribution. We also find evidence of heterogeneity in the effect of DC by day of the
week, message type, etc. These results are for the City of Folsom, CA with opt-in
program design. The precise magnitude of a DC effect on household water consumption
will vary both by location, experimental design and by time-specific conditions, such as
weather conditions and variations in other determinants of water use that correlate with
time and location.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section two discusses relevant academic
literature; Section three offers an overview of the DC business model and description of
services; Section four describes data; Section five describes empirical method and results;
the paper concludes with a discussion, summary, and policy implications in Section six.

3.2 Relevant Literature
This paper has relevance to existing literature in two particular areas: estimating the
effect of social comparison on consumption decisions, in general, and understanding the
determinants of residential water demand, in particular. Price response in household
water consumption has been studied extensively in the academic literature. Debate
persists in how decision-makers are affected by both the qualitative aspects of price

20

This elasticity is reported in (Buck, Nemati, and Sunding 2016b). This is one elasticity
from the literature and is not from our sample
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(block rates versus uniform pricing and average versus marginal) and the quantitative
changes (estimating elasticities) (Dalhuisen et al. 2003, Ito 2014, Olmstead, Hanemann,
and Stavins 2007). However, price instruments to reduce residential demand are
considered a political liability, complicate revenue estimation for utilities, and inspire
concerns over the impacts to lower-income households (Agthe and Billings 1987).
Additionally, it is widely understood that other factors determine residential water
demand, such as income, household size, lot size, landscaping, and weather. Buck,
Soldati, and Sunding (2015) use a data-driven process to identify model performance in
predicting residential water demand, which reveals that price is not necessarily the most
important determinant.
Consistent with this, utilities often employ non-price demand-side management
(DSM) strategies to influence household water consumption. Renwick and Green (2000)
estimate the effects of six different categories of non-price DSM policies, which include
information and rebate opportunities. Not surprisingly, they find that mandatory policies
result in larger demand reductions, relative to voluntary programs. They also identify
areas where more research is needed, including the effect of household characteristics
and multiple, simultaneous policy tools on aggregate demand. Services, such as DC,
which have the technological flexibility to vary signals, can amass frequent, granular data
that can be used to fill knowledge gaps. Additionally, recent research has estimated
household willingness-to-pay to avoid water service disruptions for some California
utilities (Buck et al. 2016, Buck, Nemati, and Sunding 2016a). These estimates may help
utilities evaluate the possible conservation benefits through various categories of
messaging, including social norms, information, and pro-social language

51

Social comparison of household consumption began in the residential electricity
sector. The leading figure in this movement has been Opower, which partners with
utilities to create content with the objective of reducing household electricity demand and
improving efficiency and conservation. A growing collection of research in this field has
provided estimates of program effectiveness, as well as evaluating the persistence of
treatment and examining site selection bias (Allcott 2015, Allcott and Rogers 2014,
Ayres, Raseman, and Shih 2013). These analyses estimate treatment effects in the range
of 1.2 -3.3%, which varies according to location and program implementation but appears
to persist over time. Research on heterogeneous effects suggests that targeted content that
considers sub-population attributes improves messaging response (Costa and Kahn 2013).
Allcott (2015) identifies a problem in site and population selection bias, where program
evaluation of early-adopting utilities overstates the treatment effect, relative to
implementation across less environmentally progressive regions and populations.
This business model of combining social, behavior, and data science to impact
household decision-making is being replicated in the water sector. WaterSmart Software
has been building partnerships with water utilities in California, as well as other states,
for the past several years. In one analysis, this service has been shown to cause a 5%
reduction in average consumption for two California markets, with no statistically
significant effect in a third (Brent, Cook, and Olsen 2015). A 2007 randomized
experiment in Cobb County, Georgia found strong evidence that social comparison
messages had a substantially larger impact than pro-social content and technical
recommendations (Ferraro and Price 2013). They find an estimated 4.8% effect when
treatment combines social comparison, pro-social messaging, and technical suggestions.
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Both the WaterSmart program and Georgia study find significant heterogeneity in
treatment effect across household types, while only the WaterSmart analysis observes
stable persistence in treatment effect over time. DC differs from both of these programs
for their emphasis on leveraging digital communication platforms, rather than paper
reports, which allows for greater flexibility in message content, more frequent and varied
content, and the option to survey customer feedback.
We analyze the effect of enrollment in DC service on daily water consumption in
the City of Folsom, CA. We provide evidence that the DC effect in the water sector is
comparable to and even larger than, Opower’s effect in the energy sector. Also, we
examine the heterogeneity in the treatment effect. Understanding variation in treatment
effects of DC helps target subgroups in a cost-effective manner. Also, this result helps
researchers understand the generalizability of the treatment effects to different
populations and places (Djebbari and Smith 2008, Ferraro and Miranda 2013, Heckman,
Smith, and Clements 1997, Imai and Ratkovic 2013, Manski 2004).

3.3 Overview of Dropcountr Services
DC users have access to water usage and other information anytime via their mobile
devices (iOS and Android) or by logging into their account on the web. In addition, DC
sends users a monthly email summary of their water use, including contextual
comparisons and water utility announcements. While DC can and does work with
utilities, who read their meters monthly or bi-monthly, DC is especially well suited for
utilities who have migrated to smart metering.
Users who have downloaded the mobile application receive ``push'' notifications
to their mobile devices. These notifications can alert households when they may be
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approaching the next tier for a block-pricing utility, an indication of leaks, rebate
opportunities or other tips. The web platform allows customers to access their DC
account, where they can explore their monthly report in more detail and access similar
information that may be generated through the mobile alerts. Additionally, DC will
produce and mail paper water use reports for utilities that request it.
The “Your Water” interface on both mobile and web apps includes four main
features: summary statistics of usage, which includes reference to an individualized
“goal”; comparison of usage to “similar” and “efficient” households; and conservation
tips tailored to their account characteristics. An example of this interface can be found in
Figure 3-1.
The top portion provides statistics on monthly and average daily consumption,
along with a graphical representation of their historical consumption over the previous
12-month period. Also, this portion of the report evaluates the households' performance
in achieving their “goal” water usage. A goal is an account-specific value and represents
the amount of water required by the account each month of the year. The goal is the sum
of an indoor budget, primarily determined by household occupancy, and an outdoor
budget, which based on parcel size, irrigable area and local weather and other climate
factors, such as local evapotranspiration constants. The industry standard and baseline
assumption is that 50% of parcel area is irrigated; households may update this irrigation
profile, along with other household features, in their DC account.
The social comparison component informs customers how their usage compares
to “similar” or “nearby” households and “efficient” households. A “similar/nearby”
household lies within a specified radius of the given account and is comparable in
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features, such as lot size and household occupancy. Households with consumption below
a certain percentile of the distribution are labeled “efficient” by DC. DC also provides
“Relevant water saving tips” portion as a part of the report that encourages water savings
by suggesting two conservation tips per the report, out of over 100 recommendations,
which are tailored to that particular household’s profile and past use. Finally, customers
are encouraged to log into their online account, where they may explore their report in
greater detail and receive further conservation information.

3.4 Data Sources and Description
3.4.1

Enrollment process and enrollment definition

In mid-December of 2014, all account holders in the City of Folsom water utility service
area were offered the option of participating in the DC pilot program on a “first come,
first served” basis. The offer of service came as a paper advertisement, on city letterhead,
with a monthly bill and included a market insert that illustrated the look and style of the
DC web and mobile platforms. The utility contracted for a maximum of 5,000 accounts,
with a current enrollment of just over 3,350 accounts. The City of Folsom water utility
initiated their DC program in December 2014, and enrollment in the program has
increased over time.
Progression of DC enrollment over the post-DC period is presented in Figure 3-2.
The initial pulse of enrollment was spurred, in part, by direct email when the program
was first rolled out. Beyond the initial email, the DC program has been promoted
continually on the website of the utility. Households can sign up for DC through the DC
website or use the DC mobile application from the Apple or Android app stores.
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For this analysis, households who participated in the DC service offer at any point
during the study period will be referred to as ``treated'' households, while those who do
not are “control” households. The first full month after which a household has received
their first DC report is considered the first treatment month. Therefore, since enrollment
began in December 2014, the first reports were generated in January 2015, which makes
January 2015 the first possible treatment month. This approach is consistent in defining
treatment for both Opower and WaterSmart program analysis. The rate of enrollment,
using this definition of treatment, is represented in Figure 3-2.

3.4.2

Summary statistics

Summary statistics for the data used in this analysis is presented in Table 3-1. The
average in the baseline period is 589.54 gallons per day. The enrolled group includes
3,353 households, and the never enrolled group includes 16,171 households. Balance in
observable variables in the pre-DC period between never enrolled and enrolled group is
prerequisite to investigate DC effect using the Difference-in-Differences method.
Because of data limitation on demographic information of control households in the study
we only use water consumption in the pre-DC period to check for the balance. As shown
in Table 3-1, the difference between average consumption of enrolled and never enrolled
groups is -1.79 gallons per day. A simple t-test shows that mean pre-DC consumption
values are not statistically different between these two groups.
Further investigation of the pre-trends between never enrolled and enrolled groups
is analyzed using graphical analysis. Panel (a) in Figure 3-3 presents average water
consumption (gallons per day) in the enrolled and never enrolled groups with a vertical
dashed line which indicates the DC start time. This graph illustrates that, despite
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differences in average consumption across the treated and control groups before DC,
there exists a visually distinct increase in this difference in average monthly consumption
between treated and control households, following the introduction of DC service
(indicated by the vertical dashed line). In other words, we observe graphical evidence that
there is a larger difference in average water usage after DC between those households
that enrolled in DC and those that did not enroll.
We observe this difference more clearly by plotting the difference in average
monthly consumption as a percent difference between the two groups across the sample
time horizon. Panel (b) Figure 3-3 illustrates how this percent difference changes across
the sample period. Reflecting the pattern observed in panel (a) of the same figure we see
that there is a significant increase in the difference in average consumption as a percent
between the pre-period, before the availability of DC services, and the post-period, with
households under DC treatment. In the pre-period, we observe that enrolled and never
enrolled households consume approximately the same water on average. Whereas, in the
post-period, households who are in the enrolled group consumed about 6% less water, on
average.
Figure 3-4 illustrates how the difference between treated and control groups
changes across households with different baseline consumption levels. For this figure,
quintiles of consumption are defined based on the average baseline summer usage.
Quintiles thresholds, in average gallons per day, are 401.00 and lower as the first quintile,
between 401.00 and 646.32 as the second, between 646.32 and 797.92 as the third,
between 797.92 and 1,077.19 as the fourth, and higher than 1,077.19 as the fifth quintile.
This figure illustrates that there are larger increases in the difference in average monthly
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consumption between treated and control households, following the introduction of DC
service, for the higher quintiles.
In addition to this graphical evidence of parallel trends, various fixed effects are
employed to account for weekly, seasonal, annual, and household invariant factors that
may determine consumption. Given the extensive amount of baseline data and number of
observations, these fixed effects can explain a significant amount of variation that could
otherwise bias the results. For regression analysis purpose, we organize a panel dataset of
household-level daily water consumption in the City of Folsom water utility service area.
City of Folsom panel begins January-2013 and ends in May-2017, this period includes
the start date of the DC service (December-2014). The regression results measure the
effect of DC, taking into account household characteristics that also affect consumption
(e.g., lot size) as well as any seasonal or year-specific effects on consumption. The
average effect of DC enrollment on water consumption is estimated by defining two
groups; households who enrolled in DC (treated households) and households who did not
enroll in DC (control households).

3.5 Empirical Method and Results
The figures and tables presented in the previous section motivate the empirical strategy
for this paper. Table 3-2 provides the basic double difference results and indicates that
water consumption in treated households was reduced on average by 32.04 gallons per
day, which is equivalent to 6.65% of average daily usage.
Note that in the double difference method with no additional controls, we assume
that enrollment in DC is randomly assigned. This assumption means that our estimation
result is not suffering from omitted variable bias. However, this assumption is naïve. For
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instance, in this estimation, we are omitting household-specific characteristics, like
environmental consciousness, that are related to both enrollments in DC program and
water consumption. The goal is to estimate the causal effect of enrollment in DC program
on water consumption. The primary challenges to estimating this effect are that many
observable and unobservable factors affect enrollment in DC program and water
consumption which -- if unaccounted for-- could lead to omitted variable bias in
estimates of the DC effect on water consumption. Identifying this effect is challenging
because the program is voluntary.
Diagnostics that we used to address this challenge include balance in pre-DC
usage conditional on controls. Smart water meters which record hourly water
consumption gives us the opportunity to explore DC effect using high-frequency data.
Rich data set of household level daily water consumption allows us to include various
fixed effects and control for unobservable factors. Specifically, in our preferred
specification, we estimate the following equation:
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑞ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑 ) = 𝛼1 . 𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟ℎ𝑑 + 𝛾ℎ𝑚 + 𝜇𝑚𝑦 + 𝛿𝑑 + 𝜀ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑 (1)
In equation (1), the outcome of interest is the log of the household h water
consumption in year y, month m, and day d (log(𝑞ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑 )). The variable of interest is
Dropcountr which denotes whether a household observation is in the enrolled group
during the post period in which DC was active. 𝛾ℎ𝑚 indicates household-calendar month
fixed effects, 𝜇𝑚𝑦 indicates calendar-month year fixed effects, and 𝛿𝑑 day of the week
fixed effects. 𝜀ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑 captures all unobservables which affect the dependent variable.
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3.5.1 The average effect of Dropcountr
Results for the difference-in-differences with different sets of controls are presented in
Table 3-3. Log of household-level daily water consumption is the dependent variable in
all of the specifications. Standard errors for all the specifications are reported in
parentheses and are clustered at the level of the households to account for withinhousehold serial correlation in the error term and produce consistent standard errors in
the presence of such correlation (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004). In column (1),
we include only Dropcountr which is defined by an interaction between post-period and
enrolled households, post-period, and a treated household identifier. As expected, without
controlling for a month and household-specific characteristics, we find a substantial and
negative effect of DC on water consumption. In column (2), we add control for timeinvariant household characteristics by adding household fixed effects. Comparing with
previous specification point estimate for DC effect in column (2) is closer to zero. Not
controlling for household-specific time-invariant characteristics, such as lot size, results
in bias in our point estimates away from zero. One justification for this would be, for
example, lot size is negatively related to enrollment in DC program and positively
associated with our dependent variable (average daily water consumption).
In column (3), in addition to household fixed effects, by adding month by year
fixed effects, we control for consumption factors which are common to all household
within a given calendar month for a specific year, e.g., 2015-16 water restrictions
administered by the California Water Resources Control Board. Comparing results of this
specification to column (2) results indicates that controlling for these types of omitted
variables significantly changes our point estimate of enrollment in DC effect on
consumption. In fact, not controlling for these factors bias our point estimates away from
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zero. For instance, 2015-16 water restrictions have a negative impact on consumption,
and it is likely that this factor is positively correlated with enrollment in DC program. In
our preferred specification, in addition to controlling for a month by year fixed effects,
we control for the household by month fixed effects. This type of fixed effects controls
for time-constant variables specific to a household and also calendar month specific
water-use factors specific to each household. We also use the day of the week fixed
effects which control for omitted unobservable variables which are constant over time
and specific to each day of the week. Examples of these type of variables would be
watering restrictions, weekends, etc. Results of this specification are reported in column
(4).
Results in column (4) of this table indicate that, on average, households who
enrolled in DC program reduced daily water consumption by 7.8%. This result is both
statistically and economically significant, meaning we can reject the hypothesis that there
is no effect of DC enrollment on daily water consumption. The change in average gallons
per day is an estimated 46.01 fewer gallons for the average enrolled household. To put
these reductions in perspective: the average shower uses 16-40 gallons (depending on
shower head efficiency), clothes washing machines require 25-40 gallons per wash, while
dishwashers use 6-16 gallons per load. Also, the estimates reported here are comparable
with those found for WaterSmart Software of a 4.9-5.1% average treatment effect for two
experimental designs (where no effect was found for a third utility) (Brent et al., 2015).
Notably, although the previous graphs suggest that all households reduced
consumption in the post-period, the controls in our regression analysis allow
identification of DC's effect on household consumption that takes this general reduction
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into account. Thus, we find that DC treated households reduced consumption during the
post-period more than households who did not enroll in DC. Taking into account baseline
differences and controlling for consumption factors as described in the discussion of the
econometric model presented in equation (1).

3.5.2 Investigating Heterogeneity
In this section, we move beyond estimation of average DC effects, and we consider
estimating heterogeneity of household's responses to the DC program. Understanding
heterogeneity of DC effect will allow targeting households that are more responsive,
which will be a cost-effective strategy (Djebbari and Smith 2008, Ferraro and Miranda
2013, Heckman, Smith, and Clements 1997). Also, investigating DC effect by subgroups
helps researchers understand generalizability of the result of this study to other
populations and places (Ferraro and Miranda 2013, Imai and Ratkovic 2013, Manski
2004).

3.5.2.1 Baseline consumption levels
We explore heterogeneity of DC effect by average summer baseline (pre-) period water
consumption. In this study, we defined summer as May-September months (inclusive).
For each household, we calculate the mean summer pre-DC water consumption. Next, we
create dummy variables for whether that mean summer pre-DC water consumption is in
the first, second, third, fourth, or fifth quintile of the whole sample summer pre-DC
consumption (i.e., Q.1, Q.2, etc.). Next, we interact these dummies with enrolled
household and time dummy indicators. We defined baseline consumption quintiles as
20% and lower, between 20% and 40%, between 40% and 60%, between 60% and 80%,
and higher than 80% percentiles. Quintiles thresholds, in average gallons per day, are
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401.00 and lower as the first quintile, between 401.00 and 646.32 as the second, between
646.32 and 797.92 as the third, between 797.92 and 1,077.19 as the fourth, and higher
than 1,077.19 as the fifth quintile.
log(𝑞ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑 ) = ∑𝑖=5
𝑖=1 𝛼𝑖 𝑄𝑖 . 𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟 + 𝛾ℎ𝑚 + 𝜇𝑚𝑦 + 𝛿𝑑 + 𝜀ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑 (2)

In equation (2), Qi is quintile indicator and other indicators are similar to the
definitions in equation (1). Results for this specification are reported in column (5) of
Table 3-3. The control variables in this regression correspond to columns (4) in the same
table. We find that the DC effect is monotonically increasing in baseline consumption
level-- the largest effect is observed for the group with highest baseline consumption.
These results are consistent with the average effect for all households that are estimated
and presented in column (4) of the same tables.
The analysis suggests that households in the highest quintile of the baseline consumption
reduce consumption by an estimated 18.1% in response to the DC service. However,
there appears to be an increase in usage in daily consumption for those households in the
lower quintiles of the baseline consumption. This response is referred to as a “boomerang
effect”, where customers who learn that they are using less than their neighbors or other
like-households increase their demand (Clee and Wicklund 1980). It should be noted that
the analyses on both Opower and WaterSmart do not find evidence of a boomerang effect
in any of the studied markets. The techniques employed here take a rather coarse
approach to segmenting the population. Regarding gallons per day, households in quintile
one increased their consumption by 24 gallons per day, households in quintile two, three,
four, and five decreased consumption by 0.68, 33, 70, and 172 gallons per day.
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Note that, the coefficient -0.078 in column (4) of summarizes average percent
reduction across all households. This is different from the aggregate reduction in
consumption resulting from DC because it does not take into account the fact that
households with high levels of baseline use experienced larger percentage reductions than
households with lower baseline use. Therefore, the average percentage reduction capture
by the coefficients in columns (4) is less than the weighted aggregate effect of DC. To
measure weighted aggregate DC effect, we use average use in each quintile in the
baseline period, a number of households in each quintile, and the estimated effect of DC
in each quintile. Aggregate DC effect for the population of households participating in
DC is calculated using equation (3):
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 =

∑5𝑖=1 𝑞̅𝑖 ∗𝛽𝑖 ∗(𝑁𝐻𝐻)𝑖

(3)

∑5𝑖=1 𝑞̅𝑖 ∗(𝑁𝐻𝐻)𝑖

where: Aggregate Effect is aggregate DC effect for the population of households
participating in DC, 𝑞̅𝑖 indicates average usage in 2013 for households who eventually
enrolled in DC, βi indicates estimated coefficient for the quintile i from Table 3-3,
(𝑁𝐻𝐻)𝑖 indicates the number of enrolled households in quintile i.
Results indicate that aggregate DC effect is 9.21% for the population of
households participating in the DC program. Assuming all the households in the City of
Folsom water utility service area participate in DC and have a similar response, then
aggregate DC effect would be 9.24%. Aggregate DC effect from the second case,
assuming everybody in the utility service area participates in DC, is slightly higher than
aggregate DC effect from the first case. This larger effect is because the composition of
households, in terms of baseline use, is shifted towards lower end users for the overall
population (e.g., more households will be in the lower quintiles)
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3.5.2.2 What are the specific mechanisms of DC effect?
The discrete specification above provides no sense of the dynamics of DC adoption and
water consumption: how quickly water consumption decreases after a household enrolled
in DC program and whether this effect grows, decrease, or stabilizes. Following Autor
(2003), we explore these dynamics using equation (4):
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑞ℎ𝑦𝑚 ) = ∑𝑖=𝑚
𝑖=−𝑚 𝛼𝑖 . 𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖 + 𝛾ℎ𝑚 + 𝜇𝑚𝑦 + 𝛿𝑑 + 𝜀ℎ𝑦𝑚

(4)

In equation (4), m is an indicator for a month. In the first specification, we include
indicators for one, two, and three months before enrollment in DC, 0-3 months after
enrollment, and from month four forward. Of these eight indicator variables, note that the
first seven are equal to one only in the relevant month, while the final variable is equal to
one in each month, starting with the fourth month of enrollment.
Table 3-4 presents results for this specification. Results indicate that DC effect is
not significant months before DC program starts. In the first month of the program,
households who participated in the program reduce average daily water consumption by
2.8%, on average. This effect is between 4.6%-6.9% in the subsequent months. In the
long run (4-months or more after enrollment in DC), households who participated in DC
program reduce their average daily water consumption by 7.8% in response to DC.
Next, we divided the sample into two groups and then add an indicator variable
for months 1-5 before enrollment in DC, and months 0-12 after enrollment in DC. The
first group includes all never enrolled households plus DC participant households who
enrolled between 1-1-2015 and 1-7-2015. The second group includes all the never
enrolled households plus DC participants who enrolled between 1-1-2016 and 1-7-2016.
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Using results from these specifications, we can identify how quickly does water
consumption decreases after a household enrolls in the DC program, do conservationminded people adopt first, and do early adopters respond differently.
Figure 3-5 presents the result of this specification. The coefficients on the
enrollment leads are not statistically different from zero, showing evidence of common
trends assumption, which supports the use of difference-in-differences estimator. For the
first group, in the month of enrollment, DC program reduces average daily water
consumption by 5.44%, after which this reduction fluctuates at between 3.52% and
11.22% over the subsequent 12 months. On average, we observe that households who
enrolled in the program reduce average daily water consumption by 6.52% which is
consistent with our findings in column (4) of Table 3-3. For the second group, in the
month of enrollment, DC program reduces average daily water consumption by 0.78%,
after which this reduction fluctuates at between 3.44% and 6.99% over the subsequent 12
months. On average, we observe that households who enrolled in the program reduce
average daily water consumption by 5.86%.
Results from this figure indicate that DC have stabilized over time. Also, we did
not find any evidence that early enrolled households are different from households who
adopted later and the response of these two groups to DC is not substantially different.
Finally, we these results indicate that DC effect is persistent.

3.5.2.3 Does Dropcountr indicator measure an omitted variable such as being conservation
minded?
One concern with these analyses might be that DC indicator is measuring an omitted
variable such as being conservation minded. The issue is that we cannot directly test for
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this, but we conduct the following indirect test.
Assume there is two states of the world, one with DC and another without DC.
Suppose that in a world with DC a conservation-minded person sees an advertisement for
water conservation, then looks for ways to conserve and finds DC and as a result
conserves water. Now, suppose that in a world without DC, the same conservationminded person sees the same advertisement and looks for ways to conserve and, since
there is no DC, finds conservation tips from the water utility website and conserves.
Figure 3-6 shows these two states of the word with and without DC.

Another feature of the daily data use in this study is that it indicates which type
and time of messages sent to the customers. DC sends messages like monthly report
email, leak alert, and new users tip. Note that messages like monthly report emails and
leak alerts are only available through DC. However, households can have access to
messages like new user tips without DC (e.g., through utility website, monthly bills, etc.).
Table 3-5 indicates all messages sent by DC to the customers enrolled in DC by May2017. To identify the effect of each message type on water consumption, we treat each
message type as a separate treatment. Specifically, we used the following specification to
capture the effect of each message type on daily water consumption:
𝑑=14
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑞ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑 ) = ∑𝑖=3
𝑖=1 ∑𝑑=1 𝛼𝑖𝑑 . 𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑑 + 𝛾ℎ𝑚 + 𝜇𝑚𝑦 + 𝛿𝑑 + 𝜀ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑 (6)

In equation (6), the variable of interest is Message. Message indicator only takes value
one if household i received message i at day d or d-1, d-2, …, d-13. For example,
Message12 Takes one for households who received message type 1 and on one day after
receiving the message. Figure 3-7 indicates the results of this specification. Starting with
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leak alert, we observe that leak alerts increase consumption by 60% on the first day. This
effect decreases quickly on days following the leak alert message. This result indicates
that households are paying attention to the leak alerts and trying to stop the leak
immediately following the alert. For example, one day after receiving a leak alert
message, consumption decreases by 30%. Six days after a leak alert, consumption
decreases by 50%. Monthly report emails effect on daily water consumption is negative
and significant but reduces over time. Households have the biggest reduction in
consumption on the day that they receive the report (approximately 10%). In the next 13
days, this effect fluctuates between 2%-6%.
On the other hand, new user tips type of message is not statistically significant in any of
the days after households receive these tips. This is at some level is evidence that DC
indicator is not measuring an omitted variable like being conservation minded. Even if
conservation minded type households are enrolling in DC, these results suggest that
without DC there would not be water conservation.

3.5.3 Does Dropcountr act through efficiency channel?
Following Allcott and Kessler (2015), nudges (in our application, DC reports) can affect
demand through two main channels. The first view is that nudging is informative. Based
on this view, the water market is characterized by imperfect consumer information
(households have imperfect information about their consumption history, others
consumption, methods to increase efficiency, etc.). Based on this view, we assume that
there is no moral utility and a nudge only provides information or eliminates bias. In
Figure 3-8, D0 represents the water demand curve before the introduction of social
comparison program (in our application, DC), while D1 represents the demand curve after
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the introduction of such a program. In fact, nudges improved efficiency and shifts
∗
demand curve from D0 to D1 and changed consumption by 𝐸 = 𝑄𝐷𝐶
− 𝑄∗.

Nudging effect on consumption through the efficiency channel has important
implications for calculations of ratepayer welfare losses due to disruptions in the water
supply. We assumed the water supply disruption of R= Q*-QR, where R> E. Without
programs like DC, welfare loss due to disruption R will be an area of ABCD. However, if
programs like DC are in place, and it is acting through the efficiency channel, then
welfare loss due to a similar supply disruption of R will be A’B’CD’. Note that ABCDA'B'CD'= ABD'D>0 and represents an upward bias in welfare loss estimations without
considering the effect of low-cost information programs (nudging, like DC) on demand.
The larger effect of DC on water consumption means larger shifts in the water demand
curve and larger upward bias in estimations of welfare losses due to supply disruption of
R.
The second view is that nudging effects through Moral Suasion. In this view, the
nudge itself may directly impose negative utility. For example, seeing cigarette warning
labels with graphic images of smoking-related diseases can be unpleasant, and body
weight report cards could make children feel guilty or shameful. In our application,
seeing neighbors and affect households consuming less water could make a household
feel guilty. Building on Caplin (2003) and Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2006), Glaeser
(2005) argues that many nudges are essentially emotional taxes that reduce utility but do
not raise revenues.
Now we assume full efficiency in water consumption (perfect information) and
the nudge only raises the moral price of water (in this scenario, nudge effects
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consumption through the Moral Suasion channel.) In this case, D0 in Figure 3-9 reflects
∗
the demand curve with and without the nudge. However, P ∗ moves to PDC
which reflects

water price plus moral tax. Similar to a regular tax, moral tax reduces consumer surplus
by AP*P*DCA' area. Note that moral tax does not generate revenues and only reduces
consumer surplus (reduced utility). Figure 3-9 illustrates this scenario. Same as the first
scenario, before DC, welfare loss due to a supply disruption of R would have an area of
ABCD. Welfare loss due to supply disruption of R after a moral tax, because of programs
like DC, reduces the area from ABCD to A'B'CD. However, in this scenario, we need to
account for the reduction in the consumer surplus due to the moral tax.
Taken together, welfare loss due to a supply disruption of R after a moral tax will
result in a net welfare loss of WL(R)= A'B'CD + AP*P*DCA'. WL(R) could be greater,
equal to, or smaller than ABCD, depending on the difference between ABB'E and
A'EP*P*DC. However, it is more likely to be the case that ABB'E < A'EP*P*DC, which
suggests that without considering programs like DC, we are underestimating welfare
losses due to water supply disruptions.
In this paper, we conduct an empirical test to evaluate the channel in which DC is
acting. If DC changes the weekly consumption composition, then one possibility is that
households are reoptimizing their consumption after receiving the information through
DC. To identify if households who enrolled in the program have different consumption
patterns than those who did not enroll we interact day of the week indicator with
Dropcountr indicator.
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑞ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑 ) = ∑𝑖=7
𝑖=1 𝛼𝑖 . 𝐷𝑖 . 𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟 + 𝛾ℎ𝑚 + 𝜇𝑚𝑦 + 𝛿𝑑 + 𝜀ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑 (7)
In equation (7), the variable of interest is Dropcountr, which denotes whether a household
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observation is in the enrolled group during the post period in which DC was active,
multiplied by day indicator Di .
Figure 3-10 indicates the results of this specification. Results indicate that DC has
the largest effect on Mondays and lowest effect on Saturdays and Sundays. Consumption
is at its highest level on Saturdays and Sundays and is at its lowest level on Mondays.
Next, we interact quintile indicators with a day of the week and Dropcountr indicators.
Coefficients on these variables indicate the effect of DC by day of the week and quintile
of water consumption. Results are presented graphically in Figure 3-10. We observe that,
first, DC effect is monotonically increased regardless of the day of the week. Second, we
observe the same pattern that we observed for the average effects: DC has the largest
effect on Mondays in all the quintiles. Interestingly, we observe boomerang effect for the
second quintile only on Saturdays and Sundays. DC has the lowest effect during the
weekend in a way that this effect is positive for first two quintiles, not significant in the
third quintile, and negative in the fourth and the fifth quintile.
Using this test, we observe that households change their consumption
composition within a week and it is suggestive that DC works through information
channel rather than moral suasion. It seems that households are reoptimizing their
consumption composition in a week after receiving the information from DC. Note that
this is only one test in one location and further research requires for answering this
question explicitly.

3.5.4

Information and effectiveness of non-linear pricing

The City of Folsom water utility uses an Increasing Block Pricing (IBP) for the water
rate. IBP thresholds are shown in Figure 3-11. To test whether enrollment in the DC
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program improves response to the marginal price we conduct the following test. Using
daily consumption data, we could identify households jump date from one tier to another
within a month. However, to do so, we need to observe everyday water use within a
month (e.g., households i in month m jumps from tier one to tier two in day 15 and from
tier two to tier three in day 25). For this purpose, we create a subset of data that were
complete within a month for each household.
Following Chetty et al. (2011); Saez (2010); and Ito (2014), we used bunching
around the non-linear pricing kink points to examine whether enrollment in DC makes
consumers respond to the marginal price. We used bunching of the consumers at the kink
points of nonlinear price schedules for DC enrolled households and not enrolled
households. Such bunching must be observed if consumers respond to marginal price.
As shown in Ito (2014) consumers respond to the average price rather than
marginal price without information interventions such as DC. Therefore, distribution of
consumption for not enrolled households can provide a baseline for this empirical test.
We employed consumption data from all 12 months of 2016. Next, daily water
consumption is aggregated for each household within a month. The top panel in Figure 312 shows the consumption distribution for the control households, households who never
enrolled in DC, and results indicate that consumption is smoothly distributed. The bottom
panel in Figure 3-12 shows the histogram of consumption for the DC enrolled,
households. The distribution is as smooth as the distribution in never enrolled
households, and there is no bunching around the kink points. We also find no bunching
for any year of the data. The absence of bunching implies one possibility. Consumers
have no response to the marginal price and information provided by DC did not improve
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this response. Further studies required to investigate this question in greater detail.

3.6 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This study provides insight into how social-norm-based conservation programs affect
water usage. Specifically, the effect of DC on water usage was examined by using
household-level panel data and adopting a difference-in-differences approach. Results
suggest that the introduction of the DC services for the population of households
participating in DC causes ATOT of 7.8% reduction in daily water usage.
These are also evidence that not all of the households react alike to DC. The
results hold, as a general rule, that those in the higher quintiles of baseline water usage
had the largest responses. The analysis suggests that in response to the DC service
households in the highest quintile of baseline consumption reduce water usage by an
estimated 18% --at the margin, these are a large effect. This result is comparable with the
existing literature (Allcott 2011, Brent, Cook, and Olsen 2015, Ferraro and Miranda
2013). Such a result indicates the effectiveness of sub-group targeting in social-normbased conservation programs towards baseline users with higher consumption.
Future analyses suggest that there is heterogeneity in response to the DC program.
We have evidence that DC program acts through the information channel. The simple test
indicates that DC program did not improve households' response to marginal price in the
City of Folsom water utility service area.
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3.7 Figures and Tables

Figure 3-1 Dropcountr Home Water Use Report Sample
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Figure 3-2 Enrollment Evolution in Dropcountr Program Over Time. A Total Number of
3,353 Households Enrolled by the End of April 2017 Was 3,353
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Figure 3-3 (A) Average Water Consumption (Gallons Per Day) by Enrollment Status
During the Study Period. (B) The Difference in Average Water Consumption, As a
Percent, Across Time by Enrollment Status
Notes: Vertical dashed lines Indicate start of the Dropcountr program (December 2014).
Horizontal dot lines represent the average percent difference in household consumption
for the pre- and post-Periods. Average percent difference in household consumption for
the pre-periods is approximately 0% and for post-periods is approximate -6%.
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Figure 3-4 Average Consumption (Gallons Per Day) for Enrolled and Never Enrolled
Groups by Quintile
Notes: The Vertical Dashed Line Indicates the Start of the Program (December- 2014)
Notes: Quintiles of consumption are defined based on the average baseline summer
usage. Quintiles thresholds in gallons per day are 401.00 and lower as first quintile,
between 401.00 and 646.32 as second, between 646.32 and 797.92 as third, between
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797.92 and 1,077.19 as fourth, and higher than 1,077.19 as the fifth quintile.

Figure 3-5 The Estimated Impact of Dropcountr on Water Consumption for Months
Before, During, and after Enrollment in Dropcountr Services (Includes 95% Confidence
Intervals)
Notes: Estimated effects presented in percentage forms. Horizontal bold dash lines
indicate average effect for before and after the program start date. The top portion of this
figure uses a subsample of households and includes all never enrolled households plus
DC participant households who enrolled between 1-1-2015 and 1-7-2015. The bottom
portion of this figure includes all the never enrolled households plus DC participants who
enrolled between 1-1-2016 and 1-7-2016.
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Figure 3-6 Two States of World, Top Portion with Dropcountr and Bottom Portion
without Dropcountr
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Figure 3-7 The Estimated Impact of Dropcountr on Water Consumption by Message
Types (Includes 95% Confidence Intervals)
Notes: Month by year fixed effects, household by month fixed effects, and day of the
week fixed effects used in estimation.
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Figure 3-8 The Effect of a Nudge That Acts Through Efficiency Channel on Welfare
Losses Calculations due to Water Supply Disruptions
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Figure 3-9 The Effect of a Nudge that Acts Through Moral Tax Channel on Welfare
Losses Calculations due to Water Supply Disruptions
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Figure 3-10 The Estimated Impact of Dropcountr on Water Consumption for each Day
of the Week (Includes 95% Confidence Intervals)
Notes: Month by year fixed effects, household by month fixed effects, and day of the
week fixed effects used in the estimation
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Figure 3-11 Increasing Block Pricing Structure in the City of Folsom Water Utility
Service Area, Effective Since January-2013. Before January-2013 the City of Folsom
Water Utility Used a Flat Pricing Structure
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Figure 3-12 The Figure Shows the Histogram of Household-Level Monthly Cumulative
Water Consumption in the City of Folsom, CA Water Utility Service Area.
Notes: The Vertical Solid Lines Show the Kink Points of the Nonlinear Price Schedule.
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Table 3-1 Summary Statistics of Data Available for Analysis. Average Daily
Consumption Values in Gallons for the Baseline Period

Number of accounts
Pre-DC observations
Post-DC observations
Baseline:
Average
25th percentile
Baseline median
75th percentile

All accounts Never enrolled group Enrolled group
19,524
16,171
3,353
10,769,093
8,893,550
1,875,543
10,874,899
8,825,345
2,049,554
589.54
157.09
403.95
748.05

589.23
155.60
396.47
748.05

Notes: Baseline period is January 2013 through December 2014. Dropcountr is still
active.

86

591.02
164.57
433.87
748.05

Table 3-2 Average Daily Water Consumption in the Enrolled and Never Enrolled Groups
(Gallons Per Day)
Never enrolled
households

Enrolled
households

Difference
(level)

Difference
(%)

Pre-period
Post-period

589.23
476.86

591.02
446.61

1.79
-30.25

0.3
-6.34

Double difference

-112.37

-144.41

-32.04

-6.65

Notes: Households that never enrolled in Dropcountr consumed on average 589.23
gallons of water pre-period; this number reduced to 476.86 gallons in post-period.
However, households that eventually enrolled in Dropcountr consumed 591.02 gallons of
water pre-period and 446.61 gallons in post-period. Comparing two groups indicates that
Dropcountr reduced water consumption in the enrolled group by 32 gallons per day. In
percentage terms, Dropcountr reduced water consumption in the enrolled group by
6.65%.
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Table 3-3 Dropcountr Effect on Daily Water Consumption (Gallons/Day) in the City of
Folsom, CA Water Utility Service Area
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Dropcountr

-0.11***
(0.001)

-0.101***
(0.008)

-0.081***
(0.008)

-0.078***
(0.008)

Post

-0.312***
(0.001)

-0.263***
(0.003)

Dropcountr Enrolled Household

0.055***
(0.001)

(5)

Dropcountr Effect in Quintile 1

0.118***
(0.031)

Dropcountr Effect in Quintile 2

-0.002
(0.013)

Dropcountr Effect in Quintile 3

-0.071***
(0.013)

Dropcountr Effect in Quintile 4

-0.111***
(0.013)

Dropcountr Effect in Quintile 5

-0.181***
(0.022)

Household Fixed Effects
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Household X Month Fixed
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Effects
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Month X Year Fixed Effects
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Day of the Week Fixed Effects
21,643,992 21,643,992 21,643,992 21,643,992 21,643,992
Observations
0.019
0.398
0.495
0.534
0.534
R-square
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Log of household-level daily water consumption is the dependent variable in all of the
specifications. Standard errors for all the specifications are reported in parentheses and
are clustered at the level of the households.
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Table 3-4 The Estimated Impact of Dropcountr on Water Consumption for Months
Before, During, and after Enrollment in Dropcountr Services in the City of Folsom, CA
Water Utility Service Area
(1)
Dropcountr Average Effect

(2)

-0.078***
(0.008

Three Months before Enrollment

0.008
(0.009)

Two Months before Enrollment

0.017
(0.010)

One Month before Enrollment

0.0002
(0.011)

Enrollment Month

-0.028**
(0.011)

One Month after Enrollment

-0.069***
(0.011)

Two Months after Enrollment

-0.051***
(0.010)

Three Months after Enrollment

-0.046***
(0.010)

Four Months or more after Enrollment

-0.078***
(0.009)

Yes
Yes
Household X Month Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Month X Year Fixed Effects
Yes
No
Day of the Week Fixed Effects
21,643,992
911,613
Observations
0.534
0.702
R-square
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Standard errors for all the specifications are reported in parentheses and are clustered at
the level of the households.
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Table 3-5 Summary of Messages Sent by Dropcountr to the Enrolled Customers in the
City of Folsom, CA Water Utility Service Area from December-2014 to May-2017
Message Type
Monthly report email
Leak alert
New user tips

Sending Frequency
38,348
3,157
628
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Chapter 4. ISO-14001 STANDARD AND FIRMS’ ENVIRONMENTAL
PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S. TRANSPORTATION
EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS
Abstract
Manufacturers have been increasingly relying on environmental management systems
(such as ISO 14001 based ones) to comply with government regulations and reduce waste.
In this paper, we investigated the impact of ISO 14001 certification on manufacturers’ toxic
release by release level. We applied the censored quantile instrumental variable estimator
(CQIV) to data on the U.S. transportation equipment manufacturing subsector facilities.
Results show that ISO 14001 had a negative and statistically significant effect on the top
10% manufacturing sites regarding the on-site toxic release, but it did not reduce off-site
toxic release. Therefore, one should not expect ISO 14001 to have a uniform impact on
manufacturing sites’ environmental performance. For large firms, encouraging voluntary
adoption of ISO 14001 might be an effective government strategy to reduce on-site
pollution. However, for small firms and to reduce off-site pollution, other economic
incentives or regulations are warranted.

Keywords: Censored quantile regression, Environmental performance, ISO 14001,
Manufacturing.
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4.1 Introduction
Many manufacturers have an environmental management system (EMS) to
comply with government regulations and reduce waste. Most EMSs are based on
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14001, a private standard that helps
manufacturing facilities to develop organized environmental policies, goals, and plans for
achieving their environmental objectives, and to monitor and evaluate their success. To
obtain certification to ISO 14001, a facility needs to choose a certifier (known as
certification body) that will conduct an audit and determine if the facility can be certified.
Adoption of ISO 14001 is fast-expanding in the world. For the United States, the number
of facilities with ISO 14001 certification increased from 639 in 1999 to 6,071 in 2013
(ISO, 2013). Figure 4-1 shows the top 10 countries with ISO 14001 certificates in 2013.
China ranked the highest with over 100,000 certificates, and the United States ranked the
ninth.
Adoption of ISO 14001 is growing for many different reasons. First, many
governments encourage self-regulation and voluntary actions among industries to reach
overall environmental goals. Governments want to do this because voluntary actions in
comparison with government environmental policies and economic incentives (e.g.,
pollution tax, pollution quotas, and emission trading) are less costly and may be
administratively more acceptable to the industry (Anton, Deltas, and Khanna 2004,
Arimura, Darnall, and Katayama 2011). The U.S. government has also begun to promote
greater adoption of EMSs that can be implemented through the ISO 14001 certification
process (Anton, Deltas, and Khanna 2004, Rondinelli 2001). For example, if facilities
had an active EMS in place (e.g., ISO 14001 certified) at the time of a violation of
environmental regulations, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would reduce
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the penalty associated with this violation (Curkovic, Sroufe, and Melnyk 2005, Lally
1997).
Secondly, ISO 14001 adoption may result in other benefits for manufacturing
facilities. These benefits include, based on the assumption that the environmental
performance of facilities may improve after adopting ISO 14001, improvement in
stakeholder satisfaction, fewer inspections by the EPA or other environmental regulatory
agencies, better company image, lower public pressure, and lower insurance costs
(Begley 1996a, b).
Promotional efforts toward the adoption of ISO 14001 are primarily based on the
assumption that ISO 14001 has a positive effect on facilities’ environmental performance.
However, this assumption may not hold true from either theoretical or empirical
standpoint (as shown in later sections). For this reason, many researchers have begun to
empirically examine the effect of ISO 14001 adoption on facilities' environmental
performance. Research findings of this effect are largely inconclusive. On the one hand,
some researchers found adopting ISO 14001 had a strong positive impact on
environmental performance (e.g. (Comoglio and Botta 2012, Franchetti 2011, Nguyen
and Hens 2013, Testa et al. 2014)). On the other hand, some studies only found weakly
statistically significant evidence of the effect of ISO 14001 on environmental
performance (e.g. (Barla 2007, Dahlström et al. 2003, Ziegler and Rennings 2004)), and
some others found no relationship between ISO 14001 adoption and environmental
performance at all (e.g. (Darnall and Sides 2008, Gomez and Rodriguez 2011, King,
Lenox, and Terlaak 2005, Zobel 2015)).
A commonality between all of the previous studies is that they did not
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differentiate between the levels of pollution across facilities. In reality, the effect of ISO
14001 adoption may be dependent on the actual levels of pollution a facility is currently
at, which becomes the focus of this study. For example, there is a possibility that facilities
with a high pollution level get certified because they want to lower public pressure and
get fewer inspections from the EPA. For these types of facilities, the effect of ISO 14001
on pollution level can be weak or even positive due to selection issue. Similarly, the
effect for facilities with low pollution level can also be weak because they may have
reached the minimum level of pollution and having ISO 14001 does not induce them to
further reduce pollution. Therefore, we hypothesize that the effect of ISO 14001 adoption
is different for facilities with various levels of pollution and this study provides the first
attempt to provide empirical evidence on this issue.
4.2 Background Literature
4.2.1

ISO-14001 standard overview
The first version of the ISO 14000 series, ISO 14001, was released in 1996 and

then revised in 2004. ISO 14001 provides a framework for facilities to follow so they can
set up an effective EMS. The ISO 14001 standard can assure company management,
employees, and external shareholders that environmental impact is being monitored and
improved (ISO, 2002).
To be certified by ISO 14001, facilities are required to have third-party
verification (the use of a third-party certification body) to ensure that they follow the
standard. In the first step, the facilities agree to reduce environmental impacts over time.
After the facilities agree to reduce their environmental impacts, they should prove that
their EMS meets the five key component of ISO 14001 requirements (Arimura, Darnall,
and Katayama 2011, Arimura, Hibiki, and Katayama 2008). The five essential
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components are: (1) environmental policy––a facility needs to draft an environmental
policy statement, determine objectives of the facility in terms of environmental impact,
and make this policy publically available, (2) planning––an agenda outlining the facility’s
plan to meet the goals, (3) implementation and operation––a facility will establish
necessary components to implement the program such as structure and operation,
training, and documentation, (4) checking and corrective action––a facility needs to
perform periodic monitoring to assure that the facility’s EMS meets its targets and
objectives and, if not, what corrective actions should take place, and (5) management
review––management staff should do periodical review, mostly once a year, to assure the
EMS continues to be effective and sustainable. ISO 14001 certified facilities should
follow Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle over time to maintain its registration with the ISO
(Arimura, Hibiki, and Katayama 2008, Welford 1998, Whitelaw 2004).

4.2.2

ISO 14001 and environmental performance
Considering the rapid, worldwide growth of ISO 14001 adoption, research about

the effect of this certification on the environmental performance of facilities is also
growing. As mentioned above, ISO 14001 is a non-governmental voluntary standard
through which facilities can successfully implement their EMS. The certification process
itself does not force facilities to improve their environmental performance as long as the
facilities have satisfied the requirements for certification (Corbett and Kirsch 1999).
Overall, various studies found that ISO 14001 can improve or have no impact on
environmental performance, depending on the facility’s location, the sector/industry, and
the measure of environmental performance. When we discuss “improvement of
environmental performance” or “a positive effect of certification” in this study, we mean
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a reduction of waste release/generation/emission as a result of certification. Table 4-1
provides a summary of the studies in this area, grouped by the impact of ISO 14001.
Many studies report that ISO 14001 improved environmental performance.
Montabon et al. (2000) found evidence that ISO 14001 improved both overall
environmental performance and economic efficiency of facilities. Russo and Harrison
(2001) considered the electronics sector in the U.S. and had concluded that the
certification could have a positive (and statistically significant) effect on toxic release
reduction. Another study for the same sector by Russo (2009) indicates that ISO 14001
has a positive impact on facilities emission. Also, this study showed that the earlier they
adopt it, the higher the positive impacts are. These results were also supported by the
Babakri et al. (2004) whose results indicated that recycling performance in the U.S. is
significantly positively affected by ISO 14001 certification. Also, they found that smaller
facilities and early adopters of the certification had greater improvement in recycling
performance than bigger facilities as well as late adopters. Melnyk, Sroufe, and
Calantone (2003) used North American data and found that facilities with ISO 14001
standard reduced their waste disposal. Potoski and Prakash (2005) provided evidence that
ISO 14001 certified facilities in the U.S. reduced their toxic emissions faster than noncertified facilities. More recently, Franchetti (2011) used the U.S. manufacturing firmlevel data and found that ISO 14001 certification reduced solid waste.
Some studies also provide evidence on the positive relationship between
environmental performance and ISO 14001 standard in countries other than the United
States. Ziegler and Rennings (2004) found that ISO 14001 has a weak (statistically
significant at the 10% significance level) positive effect on environmental performance at
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German manufacturing facilities. Using Japanese facility-level data, Arimura, Hibiki, and
Katayama (2008) found that ISO 14001 helped to reduce environmental impact. Nguyen
and Hens (2013) used Vietnam cement industry data and found a positive relationship
between ISO 14001 certification and environmental performance in this industry. Testa et
al. (2014) examined the effect of ISO 14001 certification effect on carbonic anhydride
emissions in energy-intensive facilities of Italy. Their result indicated a positive
relationship between ISO 14001 certification and environmental performance.
On the other hand, several studies found that ISO 14001 certification had no
statistically significant effect on the environmental performance, such as Andrews et al.
(2003); Dahlström et al. (2003), and King, Lenox, and Terlaak (2005). Barla (2007)
studied the ISO-14001 certification effect on the environmental performance of the paper
and pulp industry in Canada. This study indicated that facilities with ISO 14001
certification did not improve their environmental performance compared with noncertified facilities. Darnall and Sides (2008), using meta-analysis method, did not find
any significant relationship between ISO-14001 certification and environmental
performance improvement in the U.S. facilities. Gomez and Rodriguez (2011) tested the
effect of ISO 14001 on the toxic release of industrial facilities in northern Spain and
found that ISO 14001 certification did not have an impact on pollution. A similar finding
was reported by Zobel (2015) using Swedish manufacturing firm-level data.
Overall, the literature largely shows an inconclusive relationship between ISO
14001 standard and environmental performance. Nawrocka and Parker (2009) used 23
different studies in a meta-analysis framework to display the relationship between
environmental performance and the ISO 14001 standard. They conclude that this
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relationship is mixed and case specific.
Our study differs from the studies above in that we examine the effect of ISO
14001 on the environmental performance of facilities at different levels of pollution. This
has not been previously addressed in the literature. In the theoretical model section, we
show theoretically why the relationship between ISO 14001 certification and
environmental performance might depend on the levels of pollution. We subsequently
provide an empirical test of the hypothesis using detailed facility-level data in the U.S.
transportation equipment manufacturing subsector. In this paper, we will consider toxic
release as a representative case of environmental performance.
4.3 Theoretical Model
4.3.1

From a cost-minimization perspective

In this section, we first illustrate the impact of ISO 14001 from a simple cost
reduction standpoint (which is more applicable to perfect competition market structure)
and then analyze the impact from a full profit-maximization perspective (which is more
applicable to imperfect competition). Based on Mishan (1974) and Dasgupta, Hettige,
and Wheeler (2000), optimal emission level by facilities can be determined by the
following argument. For each facility, cost-minimizing emission intensity (i =
pollution/output) is determined by the intersection of expected marginal penalty (EMP)
and the facilities’ marginal abatement cost (MAC). EMP is the price of the pollution and
increases with the pollution intensity level. On the other hand, MAC is downward sloping
and indicates that marginal abatement cost is higher for lower levels of emission (see
Figure 4-2). MAC can be a function of different variables. For specific levels of
pollution intensity, larger facilities will generally have lower MAC than smaller
firms(Dasgupta, Hettige, and Wheeler 2000).
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Denote tc as the total cost of pollution to the facility that is the sum of (c)
pollution abatement cost, and (f), the penalty for different pollution levels. We assume
that pollution abatement cost is a function of pollution intensity. Also, there is a penalty
associated with each level of pollution intensity. Hence, f is a function of pollution
intensity as well. Equation 1 shows the cost function that facilities are minimizing:
(1) 𝑡𝑐(𝑖) = 𝑐(𝑖) + 𝑓(𝑖).
Taking first order conditions with respect to i yields equation (2), by which we can
determine the optimal level of the pollution intensity:
(2)

𝜕𝑐
𝜕𝑖

+

𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑖

= 0 or

𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑖

𝜕𝑐

= − 𝜕𝑖 .

𝜕𝑐

𝜕𝑓

Note that in equation (2), − 𝜕𝑖 = 𝑀𝐴𝐶 and

𝜕𝑖

= 𝐸𝑀𝑃. MAC can be defined as the

cost to reduce an extra unit of pollution intensity. EMP can be defined as the penalty for
an extra unit of pollution intensity, which is the price of pollution. Figure 4-2 shows this
basic framework. From the interaction of MAC1 and EMP1 the optimal level of the
facility pollution intensity can be determined, which in this case is i*.
Having different MAC and EMP functions, each facility has it is own unique
pollution intensity level. A downward shift in MAC can occur when facilities change
their production process or EMS to reduce pollution intensity (e.g. adopting ISO 14001).
In fact, pollution-intensive facilities will face higher marginal cost because regulatory
scrutiny intensifies at a higher level of pollution intensity (e.g. marginal production cost
increases as a result of more frequent inspections by the regulator) and these facilities
also face higher pressure from consumers, shareholders, and the local community. As
shown in figure 4-2, as a result of ISO 14001 adoption, we expect that MAC1 shifts
downward to MAC2 and holding EMP constant at EMP1, optimal pollution level
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decreases from i* to i1. On the other hand, certification may act as a signaling tool and
reduce the pressure from consumers, shareholders, and community on the facility. As a
result of this, we can expect a downward shift in EMP (from EMP1 to EMP2). Holding
MAC constant at MAC1, this shift leads to an increase in the pollution level by the
facility from i* to i2. Optimal pollution intensity could, therefore, increase, decrease or
remain unchanged following ISO 14001 certification. Therefore, the impact of ISO
14001 depends on the cost effect (MAC), the benefits effect (reduced EMP), and likely
the original optimal pollution intensity. If the cost effect dominates, then we would
expect pollution intensity to decrease due to certification. If the benefit effect dominates,
pollution intensity should increase due to certification.
4.3.2

From a profit-maximization perspective
In this paper, we propose a new framework to analyze the impact of certification

on pollution intensity, in which facilities maximize profit instead of minimizing cost. The
main advantage of this framework is it provides insight into why certification’s effect on
pollution intensity might depend on the production technology that generates pollution
(we show this using a monopoly market structure) and firm size (we illustrate this point
in an asymmetric Cournot model).
Consider a profit-maximizing monopolist whose profit depends on price (p), the
quantity of production (q), and production cost (c).21 We specify the production cost as
𝑐[𝑞, 𝑙(𝑞), 𝑡)], where l is the total pollution level (l = i*q) and t denotes certification (we
assume a continuous degree of certification to facilitate comparative statics analysis). The
inclusion of pollution level in the cost function reflects the abatement cost of pollution,

21

We did not specify the aforementioned penalty for different pollution levels (f) to make results more
generalizable. In addition, such cost is more closely tied to the pollution intensity rather than the production
level, and will drop out of the first-order condition.
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which should increase with production level. The profit function for a monopolistic firm
is
(3) 𝜋 = 𝑝(𝑞, 𝑡)𝑞 − 𝑐[𝑞, 𝑙(𝑞), 𝑡)] ,
Where we assume certification may enhance demand for the firm’s products if buyers
(especially institutional ones) care about this attribute. The first order condition with
respect to q is:
𝜕𝜋

(4) 𝜕𝑞 = 𝑝 + 𝑞𝑝𝑞 − 𝑐𝑞 − 𝑐𝑙 𝑙𝑞 ,
where 𝑝𝑞 denotes the partial derivative of p with respect to q, and so on. Totally
differentiating equation (4) leads to the following:
(5) 𝑝𝑞 𝑑𝑞 + 𝑝𝑡 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑝𝑞 𝑑𝑞 + 𝑞(𝑝𝑞𝑞 𝑑𝑞 + 𝑝𝑞𝑡 𝑑𝑡) − (𝑐𝑞𝑞 𝑑𝑞 + 𝑐𝑞𝑙 𝑑𝑙 + 𝑐𝑞𝑡 𝑑𝑡) −
(𝑐𝑞𝑙 𝑑𝑞 + 𝑐𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑙 + 𝑐𝑙𝑡 𝑑𝑡) 𝑙𝑞 − 𝑙𝑞𝑞 𝑐𝑙 𝑑𝑞 = 0.
To focus on the impact of certification, we assume the following second-order derivatives
are zero without losing much generalizability: 𝑝𝑞𝑡 (certification does not change the slope
of the demand curve), 𝑐𝑞𝑞 , 𝑐𝑞𝑙 , and 𝑐𝑙𝑙 (constant marginal cost with respect to production
and pollution). After simplifying and some rearrangement, equation (5) becomes
(6)

𝑑𝑞
𝑑𝑡

𝑝𝑡 −𝑐𝑞𝑡 −𝑐𝑙𝑡 𝑙𝑞

= −2𝑝

𝑞 −𝑞𝑝𝑞𝑞 +𝑙𝑞𝑞 𝑐𝑙

𝑙

Note that by definition, the pollution intensity is expressed as 𝑖 = 𝑞. To see how
certification may affect pollution intensity, we can totally differentiating i with respect to
t and obtain:
𝑑𝑖

(7) 𝑑𝑡 =

(𝑙𝑞 −𝑖) 𝑑𝑞
𝑞

𝑑𝑡

(𝑙𝑞 −𝑖)(𝑝𝑡 −𝑐𝑞𝑡 −𝑐𝑙𝑡 𝑙𝑞 )

= 𝑞(−2𝑝

𝑞 −𝑞𝑝𝑞𝑞 +𝑙𝑞𝑞 𝑐𝑙 )

.

Equation (7) warrants some additional analysis. Note that −𝑞𝑝𝑞𝑞 /𝑝𝑞 is the elasticity of
the slope of the inverse demand curve (a measure of the convexity of the demand curve),
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which is generally assumed to be less than two in the literature (Dixit 1986, Zheng, Bar,
and Kaiser 2010). Therefore, given the assumption of a downward sloping demand curve
𝑝𝑞 , the −2𝑝𝑞 − 𝑞𝑝𝑞𝑞 term in (7) is positive (this is most clear when demand is linear and
𝑝𝑞𝑞 = 0). In addition, we expect that pollution increases with production (𝑙𝑞 > 0) and
pollution increases cost (𝑐𝑙 > 0); certification enhances demand (𝑝𝑡 ≥ 0), reduces
marginal cost of producthe tion (𝑐𝑞𝑡 ≤ 0), and/or reduces marginal cost of pollutionthe
(𝑐𝑙𝑡 ≤ 0). The last three effects capture the intended impacts of certification. Therefore,
the (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑞𝑡 − 𝑐𝑙𝑡 𝑙𝑞 ) term in (7) is positive. Assume 𝑙(𝑞) = 𝛼1 𝑞 + 𝛼2 𝑞 2 , so that

(𝑙𝑞 −𝑖)
𝑞

becomes 𝛼2 . Therefore, we will have three scenarios for the impact of certification on
pollution intensity, depending on the production technology that determines the sign of
𝑙𝑞𝑞 .
Scenario 1: 𝑙𝑞𝑞 = 0, pollution increases with production linearly. Under this
scenario, certification increases production but does not affect pollution intensity.
Scenario 2: 𝑙𝑞𝑞 > 0, that is, pollution increases with production at an increasing
rate. Under this scenario, the sign of (7) is positive. That is, certification will increase
both production and pollution intensity.
Scenario 3: 𝑙𝑞𝑞 < 0, that is, pollution increases with production at a decreasing
rate. Under this scenario, the sign of (7) is indeterminate. If 𝑙𝑞𝑞 is sufficiently negative,
then certification will decrease production but increase pollution intensity; otherwise,
certification will increase production but decrease pollution intensity.
Overall, the above analysis shows that the impact of certification on production
and pollution intensity depends crucially on the production technology that generates
pollution. For some facilities, especially smaller ones without much investment in new
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technology, certification may increase pollution intensity. Large facilities may generate
pollution at a decreasing rate along with production. For them, certification should reduce
pollution intensity. It is this theoretical ambiguity that necessitates an empirical
investigation of the impact of certification on environmental performance.
We now show how the size of a facility might affect the impact of certification on
production building on the work by Zheng, Bar, and Kaiser (2010). The impact of
certification on facility j’s production in an asymmetric Cournot market assuming
constant marginal cost and 𝑙𝑞𝑞 = 0 can be expressed as (Zheng, Bar, and Kaiser (2010),
equation 5)
(8)

𝑑𝑞𝑗
𝑑𝑡

=

𝑝𝑡 (𝑠𝑗 𝑁𝐸−𝐸+1)
−𝑝𝑄 (1+𝑁−𝐸)

where Q is market demand, N is the number of facilities supplying products in the
market, 𝑠𝑗 is the market share of the output of the j-th facility, and 𝐸 = −𝑄𝑝𝑄𝑄 /𝑝𝑄 is a
measure of demand curve convexity. Zheng, Bar, and Kaiser (2010) show that the
denominator of (8) is positive. Therefore, the impact of certification on production
depends on the facility’s market share and demand convexity. For example, for convex
demand curve that features E > 1, then only sufficiently large facilities’ production will
increase with certification. For concave demand (E < 0), only sufficiently small facilities’
production will increase with certification, highlighting how facility size may affect the
impact of certification.
4.4 Data
This study uses facility-level cross-sectional data for the year of 2013 because
certification data over the years are not available. We focus on the facilities in the U.S.
transportation equipment manufacturing subsector, which is under code 336 based on the
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North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). By definition, industries in this
subsector produce equipment for the transportation of people and goods (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2015). We chose to use this subsector because it is one of the largest industrial
sectors in the United States and ISO 14001 adoption is popular in this subsector. In 2014,
this subsector had 1.6 million employees (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015). Also, a
random sample of all facilities in the U.S. industrial sector shows that this subsector is the
most popular for adopting ISO 14001 with 20 percent adoption rate in 2013. Regarding
pollution level, this subsector had the second highest amount of toxic release in 2013,
after the metal manufacturing subsector (NAICS 331). This high degree of pollution is
another reason we chose this subsector for further investigation (Toxics Release
Inventory, 2013 and author calculations).
We use data from three different sources. The first part includes environmental
variables such as toxic release that is obtained from The EPA Toxics Release Inventory
(TRI) database. TRI contains annual facility-level data on toxic release. Based on
Emergency Planning and Community-Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA) law, all
manufacturing facilities in the U.S. are required to report to the EPA the amount of toxic
they release into the air, land, and water for more 320 toxic chemicals. Using the TRI
database, there were 1,261 facilities in the U.S. transportation equipment manufacturing
subsector that reported their amount of toxic release. The second part of the data is the
information about facility characteristics such as sales volume and the number of
employees. We obtained this data from the ReferenceUSA Company, which provides
data on U.S. businesses. Because ReferenceUSA did not have information on all facilities
on our list, our usable sample size reduced to 678. Finally, information about the number
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and type of certification for these facilities was obtained from the Independent
Association of Accredited Registrars Directory (IAAR).
4.5 Empirical Model
4.5.1

A measure of environmental performance
Given that total pollution/emission is assumed linearly related to

pollution/emission intensity, the dependent variable in this paper is environmental
performance measured by the total toxic release by sample facilities in 2013. For
robustness purpose, we use both on-site toxic releases and off-site transfers as dependent
variables. Using disaggregated emission data, we could identify the effect of ISO 14001
adoption on a particular type of disposal method.
EPA has regulations on off-site toxic chemicals transfer under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Based on the RCRA, only facilities that meet
technology-based standards for construction and operation can have an off-site toxic
release. There can also be extra costs, such as the cost of shipping, related to off-site toxic
treatment. Also, there are technical standards for waste treatment at the end-of-the-pipe
(Andrews 2006, Anton, Deltas, and Khanna 2004). As a result, compared to off-site
releases, on-site releases may be cheaper and more convenient for facilities to pursue thus
can create more social pressure from the neighboring communities and shareholders
(Anton, Deltas, and Khanna 2004).
4.5.2

Control variables
We provide detailed information on all variables used in this study in Table 4-2.

The first and most important group of variables are the types of certifications that
facilities held in 2013. In this group of variables, we have environmental certification
such as ISO 14001 and other types of certification such as ISO 9001 (general quality
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management system). In our models, ISO 14001 is a binary variable that takes the value
of one if the facility has ISO-14001 certification in 2013 and takes the value of zero
otherwise. Number and type of certification for these facilities was obtained from the
IAAR. Variable ISO 9001 is defined and obtained similarly.
Facility characteristics such as sales volume, production growth ratio, facility
credit score, facility type, community population of the facility location, and facility size
represent the first group of independent variables. These variables are measured at 2013
and were provided by RefrenceUSA dataset except the production growth ratio. Most of
these variables are self-explanatory except a few: the production growth ratio, provided
by the TRI dataset, indicates the rate of production growth by each facility over the
previous year. A facility credit score is a number from 0 to 100; a higher number
indicates a better credit score. Four different groups of facilities are created based on
facilities type. Facilities can be headquarters, branch, subsidiary, and single location.
Finally, we have the industry type fixed effects. The NAICS divided the U.S.
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing Subsector into seven smaller subsector groups.
These subsectors are: Motor Vehicle Manufacturing (NAICS 3361), Motor Vehicle Body
and Trailer Manufacturing (NAICS 3362), Motor Vehicle Parts Manufacturing (NAICS
3363), Aerospace Product and Parts Manufacturing (NAICS 3364), Railroad Rolling
Stock Manufacturing (NAICS 3365), Ship and Boat Building (NAICS 3366), and other
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing (NAICS 3369). To differentiate between
different subsector groups, we have dummy variables for each industry.
The third group of independent variables in this paper is pollution related. We use
a binary variable to indicate if a facility is releasing chemicals under the Clean Air Act
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(CAA) regulation. The idea is that if the chemicals released are under the CAA
regulation; then there may be more pressure from the public on the facility which may
subsequently lead to a lower level of pollution level. In addition to chemicals, we use a
dummy variable to indicate whether a facility is releasing metals that are regulated by the
EPA.
4.5.3

Summary statistics
Table 4-3 shows summary statistics for the sample facilities used in this paper.

The first panel shows toxic release by the facility. On average facilities in 2013 release
around 6,000 pounds, with two-thirds of release coming from on-site release. The second
panel shows facility characteristics. Sales for these facilities in 2013 vary from 83 dollars
to 22 million dollars, providing ample degree of variation for our estimation.
Table 4-4 shows the summary statistics for different types of certification held by
facilities. About 15 percent of the facilities in our sample have at least one type of
certification, and about 6 percent of the facilities have ISO 14001 certification. The most
popular certification is ISO 9001 (held by 10 percent of facilities).
4.5.4 Statistical method and econometric specification
Our basic estimating equation is:
(9)

ln(𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑖 ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑆𝑂14001𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

where 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑖 is the environmental performance in facility i which in this paper is defined
as totaa l toxic release in facility i, 𝐼𝑆𝑂14001𝑖 is a dummy variable previously defined,
and 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of control variables such as log of sales volume,a log of population, aa
nd etc. which is explained in the Table 4-2, 𝜇𝑖 is an industry fixed effects, and 𝜀𝑖 captures
all unobservable factors affecting the dependent variable.
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We chose the econometric models to fit our objectives and nature of data. Our
goal is to test the effect of ISO 14001 on environmental performance and check if this
effect is different for high pollution-generating facilities compared with low pollutiongenerating facilities. Quantile regression is the appropriate model in this case.
A potential problem with our dataset is sample selection bias. Based on TRI
dataset, facilities that manufacture or process more than 25,000 pounds of TRI-listed
chemicals or use more than 10,000 pounds of a listed chemical in a given year must
report to TRI (USEPA 2013). In other words, the probability of not reporting to TRI is
related to the level of toxic release, and this can cause sample selection bias. Facilities
that do not report their toxic release level cannot affect our estimation (Russo 2009). To
address this issue, we use the censored quantile regression (CQR) (Powell 1986).
Endogeneity is also another potential problem in our study. Specifically, in our
study, this can be a potential problem because of measurement error (Frisch 1934) and
sample selection (Heckman 1979). It is possible that facilities choose to have ISO 14001
because they have high pollution level, and certification helps them lower the pressure
from consumers as well as inspection regulators. The estimation will be biased if these
endogeneity issues are not addressed. Anton, Deltas, and Khanna (2004) used an
instrumental variable to deal with this issue. A quantile regression estimator that
considers both our potential problems was introduced by Chernozhukov, Fernández-Val,
and Kowalski (2015), known as the censored quantile instrumental variable (CQIV)
estimator. Combining quantile regression with censoring and endogeneity, we use the
CQIV estimator. Our preferred estimating equation becomes:
(10)

̃ 𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖
ln(𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑖 ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑆𝑂14001

108

̃ 𝑖 is 𝐼𝑆𝑂14001𝑖 instrumented with ISO9001 in the first-stage regression
where 𝐼𝑆𝑂14001
equation:
(11)

𝐼𝑆𝑂14001 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝐼𝑆𝑂9001𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖 𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜐𝑖

4.6 Results
Tables 4-5 and 4-6 present the empirical results. We report the coefficient for ISO
14001 here and report the estimated coefficients for the other controls in Appendix Table
A1. OLS and quantile regression results are reported in table 4-5 and both suggest that
ISO14001 certification does not have a statistically significant effect on total toxic
release.
We then applied the quantile regression with consideration of endogeneity and
censoring in our models and results are presented in Table 4-6. In the case of
endogeneity, variables that are correlated with ISO 14001 adoption but not with the
pollution level (i.e., the error term) are needed. To address this issue, we used ISO 9001
as instrumental variables (IV) for ISO 14001. ISO 9001 is a quality management system
standard. To become certified, an organization needs to demonstrate its ability to
consistently provide product that meets customer and applicable statutory and regulatory
requirements, and aims to enhance customer satisfaction through the effective application
of the system, including processes for continual improvement and the assurance of
conformity to customer and applicable statutory and regulatory requirements (ISO, 2015).
ISO 9001 certification is a good candidate for an instrument for several reasons.
First, certification decisions to ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 are correlated. Christmann and
Taylor (2001) investigated the relationship between ISO 14001 and ISO 9001, and their
result indicates a positive relationship between these two certifications. The positive
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relationship is mostly because ISO 9001 certified facilities could have lower learning cost
in the adoption of ISO 14001. These two certifications share the management systembased approach including document and record control, internal audits, corrective
actions, preventive actions, continual improvement, and management reviews
(Christmann and Taylor 2001, Potoski and Prakash 2004). Second, facilities with ISO
9001 certification would be familiar with the general structure of an ISO management
standard, the necessary paperwork involved in certification. These facilities may already
have established relationships with local ISO auditors. Therefore, it is reasonable to
expect that a facility may start with ISO 9001 certification. As they become more familiar
with ISO standards, they may proceed to adopt ISO 14001 environmental standard. We
also tested for the weak instrument hypothesis in the first-stage regression. The t-value
for the ISO 9001 coefficient (which is positive) is 3.2, implying this is not a weak
instrument.
Despite these similarities, there is a major difference between ISO 9001 and ISO
14001. While ISO 9001 focuses on facilities’ product and management quality aspects,
ISO 14001 focuses on facilities’ environmental aspects and impacts. With ISO 9001
certification, facilities need to fulfill requirements and ensure customer satisfaction, while
continuously improving the effectiveness of its operations. ISO 9001 is to control product
quality and does not require companies to account for the impact of their activities on
their surroundings. However, ISO 14001 is for environmental management and facilities
need to minimize its effect on the environment. One requirement of both of these
standards is that facilities document their processes (assuming that facilities control the
quality of their products under the ISO 9001 certification and the environmental impact
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of their activities under the ISO 14001 certification) if they have those processes are
written down (Bénézech et al. 2001, Larsen and Häversjö 2001). Overall, ISO 9001
adoption should not affect pollution much due to the standard’s scopes and emphases.
Panel A in Table 4-6 shows CQIV estimation results. The effect of ISO 14001
now is not statistically significant for the first, second, or third quartile of data. However,
such effect is negative and statistically significant (at the 5% significance level) for the
90th percentile (that is, the top 10% of facilities regarding total toxic release). The 95%
confidence intervals of estimated parameters were obtained via non-parametric bootstrap.
We used Wald test statistics to test for differences in the coefficients across quantiles.
Wald test results show that the null hypothesis (that they are identical) can be rejected at
the 1% significance level.
For robustness check, we differentiated pollution levels as on-site and off-site and
conducted a similar analysis, respectively. These can be seen in Panel B and C in Table
4-6. The results indicate that the effect of ISO 14001 on on-site pollution level is similar
to the effect of ISO 14001 on total toxic release level. However, we found that ISO 14001
had no statistically significant effect on off-site pollution level.
4.7 Summary and Conclusion
Manufacturers have been increasingly relying on EMSs to comply with
government regulations and reduce waste. In this paper, we investigated the impact of
EMSs on facilities’ toxic release. More specifically, we tested the hypotheses that the
effect of ISO 14001 certification is related to facilities’ pollution levels. We used three
different sources to collect data on facility characteristics, toxic release by facilities, and
finally, certification types that facilities hold.
We applied the censored quantile instrumental variable estimator (CQIV) to data
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on the U.S. transportation equipment manufacturing subsector facilities. CQIV estimator
results indicate that ISO 14001 had a negative and statistically significant effect on the
top 10% facilities in terms of on-site toxic release and total toxic release (on-site and offsite combined). We did not find any impact of ISO 14001 on off-site toxic release. In
other words, ISO 14001 is effective for decreasing on-site pollution by facilities and is
not effective in decreasing off-site pollution.
These findings may have important policy implications. We should not expect
ISO 14001 to have a uniform impact on manufacturing sites’ environmental performance,
as indicated by our theoretical section and empirical evidence. We found that the impact
of ISO 14001 depends on whether the toxic release is on site or off site, and on whether
the toxic release is large enough. Therefore, for large facilities, encouraging voluntary
adoption ISO 14001 might be an effective government strategy to reduce on-site
pollution. However, for small facilities and to reduce off-site pollution, other economic
incentives or regulations are warranted.
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4.8 Figures and Tables

Figure 4-1 Top 10 Countries for ISO 14001 Certificates in 2013
120,000
104,735

Number of Facilities

100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
24,662 23,723
20,000

16,879 16,051
8,744 7,983 7,940 6,071 5,872

0

Source: The ISO Survey of Certifications 2013.
Notes: In the United States firms with ISO 14001 increased from 639 in 1999 to 6,071 in
2013.
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Figure 4-2 Optimal Pollution Intensity Determination
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Notes: Pollution intensity level could increase or decrease after certification adoption depending
on the movements of MAC and EMP.
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Figure 4-3 Log of Total Toxic Release in Different Quantiles
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Table 4-1 Summary of the Literature on How ISO 14001 Affects Environmental
Performance
Authors (year)
Montabon et al. (2000)
Russo and Harrison
(2001)
Russo (2009)
Babakri et al. (2004)

Country

Sector/Industry

A measure of Environmental
Performance

Impact of ISO 14001 on
Environmental Performance

U.S.

Manufacturing (SIC
20-39)

not specified

Improves

U.S.

Electronic sector

toxic release

improves

U.S.
U.S.

Electronic sector
Not specified
manufacturing (SIC
20-39)
Manufacturing (SIC
20-39)
Manufacturing (SIC
20-39)

toxic release
recycling

improves
improves

waste disposal

improves

Toxic release

improves

Solid waste generation

improves

Melnyk et al. (2003)

U.S.

Potoski and Prakash
(2005)

U.S.

Franchetti (2011)

U.S.

Arimura et al. (2008)

Japan

manufacturing

Italy

Automotive sector

Vietnam

cement industry

Comoglio and Botta
(2012)
Nguyen and Hens
(2013)
Testa and et al. (2014)

Italy

Ziegler and Rennings
(2004)

German

Dahlström et al. (2003)
Barla (2007)
King et al. (2005)
Darnall and Sides (2008)
Gomez and Rodriguez
(2011)
Zobel (2015)

U.K.
Canada
U.S.
U.S.

Use of natural resources, Solid
waste generation, and Wastewater
effluent
Use of resources, waste
management, release to water, etc

paper and pulp
industry
Manufacturing
(NACE-Codes 1537)
Not specified

improves

dust, SO2, and NO2

improves

carbonic anhydride emissions

improves

not specified

weakly positive

compliance with environmental
regulations

did not improve

discharges of BOD or TSS

did not improve

The deviation between observed
and predicted waste generation

no relationship

not specified

no relationship

energy intensive
facilities
manufacturing
(NACE-Codes 1537)
Not specified

improves

Spain

manufacturing

toxic release

no relationship

Sweden

manufacturing

waste generation

no relationship

116

Table 4-2 Description of Variables
Variable
Total Toxic
Release

Definition
A "release" of a chemical means
that it is emitted to the air or
water, or placed in some type of
land disposal (See the EPA
website for more information).

ISO 14001

Environmental management
certification published by ISO

ISO 9001

Quality management system
standard certification published
by ISO

Sales Value ($)

Sales value of the facility

Production
Growth Ratio

Facility Credit
Score
Facility Type

Community
Population

Size of the
Facility
CAA Chemical

Metal Category

An indicator of facility
production volume changes with
respect to the previous year.
Production ratio is calculated by
dividing production volume in
year t to production volume in
year t-1.
Credit rating code of the facility
(0-100). A higher number
indicates better credit score.
Indicates facility type including
headquarter, branch, subsidiary,
and single location.
The resident population of the
city in which the facility is
located. Some assignments can
be unclear, such as when cities
cross county lines. To maintain
this granularity, the actual
assignment is done at a zip
level.
Indicates the square footage of
the location that a facility
operates at.
If a facility is releasing chemical
under the Clean Air Act (CAA)
regulation.
If a facility is releasing metal
defined by the EPA. (See the
EPA website for categories and
takes)

Variable used

Data source

Log of total toxic release

TRI

Dummy (1 if facility
holds ISO 14001
certification, 0
otherwise)
Dummy (1 if facility
holds ISO 9001
certification, 0
otherwise)
Log of sale for each
facility

IAAR

IAAR

RefrenceUSA

Continuous variable

TRI dataset

Continoues variable

RefrenceUSA

Dummy variable

RefrenceUSA

Continoues variable
(log of population size)

RefrenceUSA

Continoues variable
(log of facility size)

RefrenceUSA

Dummy variable

TRI dataset

Dummy variable

TRI dataset
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Table 4-3 Summary Statistics, 2013
Variable

Number of
Observations

Mean

Min

Max

S.D

678
678
678

6,355
4,679
1,674

0
0
0

139,733
139,733
93,867

16,984
15,222
7,968

678
678
678
678

290,288
0.98
96

83
0
70

88,225

12,500

1,000,000

198,928

678
678

34,980
0.77

1,250
0

40,000
1

10,058
0.421

Panel A: Toxic release by facilities (unit: pound)
Total Release
On-Site Release
Off-Site Release
Panel B: Firm characteristics
Sales ($)
Production Ratio
Facility Credit Score
Community
Population
Size of the Facility
CAA Chemical
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22,372,184 1,187,161
7.69
0.56
100
5

Table 4-4 Summary of the Certification Types Held by Facilities in 2013
Certification Type
At Least One Type of
Certification
ISO 14001- 2004
ISO 9001-2008
AS9100C-2009
ISO/TS 16949

Number of
Facilities

Percentage of Total Sample
(Percent)

102

15.05

37
64
19
30

5.46
9.44
2.80
4.42
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Table 4-5 OLS Regression Result and Quantile Regression Result at Different Quantiles
Panel A: Dependent variable: log of total toxic release (pounds)
Quantile Regression
OLS
25%
50%
75%
Regression
-0.92
-1.52
-1.43
-1.02
ISO 14001
(0.56)
(1.02)
(0.98)
(0.64)
Panel B: Dependent variable: log of total on-site toxic release (pounds)
-1.05*
-1.35
-2.02
-0.88
ISO 14001
(0.58)
(0.91)
(1.58)
(0.68)
Panel C: Dependent variable: log of total off-site toxic release (pounds)
-1.25
-0.83
-1.76
-1.09
ISO 14001
(0.80)
(0.94)
(1.23)
(1.01)
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90%
-0.904
(1.05)
0.39
(0.69)
-0.18
(1.14)

Table 4-6 OLS Regression Result and Instrumental Variable Censored Quantile
Regression Result at Different Quantiles
Panel A: Dependent variable: log of total toxic release (pounds)
CQIV Regression
OLS
25%
50%
75%
90%
Regression
-3.31
-1.14
-1.10
-0.31**
ISO 14001
-0.92
(-9.06)
(-11.36)
(-6.63)
(-5.02)
(0.56)
[1.52]
[2.08]
[1.16]
[-0.25]
Panel B: Dependent variable: log of total on-site toxic release (pounds)
-1.78
-1.25
-0.56
-0.36**
ISO 14001
-1.05*
(-11.02)
(-9.50)
(-8.35)
(-4.52)
(0.58)
[1.64]
[1.52]
[1.23]
[-0.15]
Panel C: Dependent variable: log of total off-site toxic release (pounds)
-5.18
-1.41
-1.75
-1.47
ISO 14001
-1.25
(-11.87)
(-3.85)
(-2.11)
(-1.06)
(0.80)
[9.74]
[10.41]
[8.06]
[11.25]
N=678
Notes: Lower bounds of bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals from bootstrap
replications are in parentheses and upper bounds are in brackets. ** indicates the 95%
confidence interval does not include zero. Industry dummies are not displayed but can be
seen in the appendix.
t-value from first stage=6.24
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4.9 Appendix A
Table 4-7 Instrumental Variable Censored Quantile Regression Result at Different
Quantiles

Log of Sales

Production Growth Ratio

Facility Credit Score

Facility Type (Branch)

Facility Type (Single Location)

Log of Population

Log of Facility Size

CAAC Chemical

Metal Category 1

Metal Category 2

Constant

Quantiles
25

50

75

90

-0.192

0116

0.111

0.084

(-0.218)

(-0.161)

(-0.214)

(-0.220)

[0.558]

[0.455]

[0.358]

[0.378]

0.674

0.433

0.224

0.129

(-0.310)

(-0.176)

(-0.030)

(-0.321)

[1.254]

[0.671]

[0.420]

[1.476]

0.137

0.033

0.033

0.050

(-0.035)

(-0.011)

(-0.007)

(-0.028)

[0.230]

[0.187]

[0.159]

[0.118]

3.090

-1.717

-0.494

-0.172

(-3.864)

(-1.761)

(-1.668)

(-2.173)

[4.215]

[4.908]

[6.941]

[1.330]

3.964

-1.035

-0.352

0.187

(-3.267)

(-1.711)

(-1.151)

(-2.361)

[5.346]

[6.475]

[7.044]

[1.791]

-0.232

-0.183

-0.008

-0.078

(-0.348)

(-0.556)

(-0.454)

(-0.370)

[0.250]

[-0.014]

[0.215]

[0.186]

-0.638

-0.642

-0.579

-0.480

(-2.234)

(-2.016)

(-1.992)

(-1.650)

[-0.453]

[-0.211]

[-0.321]

[-0.365]

0.190

0.633

0.126

-1.518

(-0.418)

(-0.701)

(-0.736)

(-1.011)

[1.756]

[1.173]

[1.618]

[1.264]

-2.470

-1.890

-0.656

1.146

(-3.992)

(-3.147)

(-2.439)

(-2.005)

[0.116]

[2.387]

[6.317]

[3.746]

-6.486

-6.242

-4.327

-1.268

(-8.377)

(-6.209)

(-5.692)

(-4.941)

[-3.911]

[-1.453]

[3.010]

[1.238]

2.490

7.484

11.966

10.690

(-3.993)

(-4.399)

0.265

2.192

[14.475]

[15.668]

[21.854]

[28.285]

Notes: Dependent variable: log of total toxic release (pounds). Lower bounds of bias-corrected 95%
confidence intervals from bootstrap replications are in parentheses and upper bounds are in brackets
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Chapter 5. CONCLUSION
5.1 Summary
This dissertation sought to investigate non-price based environmental policies with a
primary focus on water conservation policies and pollution control policy. In the first
essay, we evaluate a command- and- control type policy; the second essay considers
voluntary adoption of a water conservation technology, and the third essay evaluates the
effectiveness of voluntary adoption of a pollution control certification. Results of each
essay are discussed below, along with broader implications, and their connection to each
other.
California’s 2015 urban water mandate is an example of a regulatory,
environmental policy that adopted most recently. To mitigate the adverse impacts of
drought, in April 2015 Governor Jerry Brown issued an executive order mandating a
statewide reduction in water use by 25% in urban areas, which generally targeted
residential water-use. The aggregate cost of the governor’s mandate regarding lost
consumer welfare is an estimated $875 million. The cost to implement the water
conservation mandate is $106 million in the San Francisco Bay area and $769 million in
Southern California. In other words, Northern California households have a WTP of $24
per month to avoid the conservation mandate. Households in Southern California have a
WTP of $26 per month to avoid this mandate.
Results of this essay indicate that California’s water mandate, as an example of
regulatory, environmental policy, is associated with welfare losses which may not be so
tangible to some policymakers. Also, estimating these losses would be beneficial for
evaluating alternative policy options such as market-based policies. Another important
result of the first essay is the evidence that welfare losses are substantially different
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across different utilities, depending on several factors such as elasticity of water demand.
The results also indicate that on average, consumers in Northern California overcomplied with the conservation mandate, while those in Southern California slightly
under-complied.
Results of the first essay provide evidence on the two main concerns with commandand-control type policies including welfare losses and compliance. However, voluntary
approaches, as another type of non-price method, compared with regulatory approaches
might be more cost-effective. The central issue with voluntary approaches is that it is
difficult to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of these policies. In the second and the
third essay, we focus on evaluating the effectiveness of two popular voluntary programs:
a water conservation technology and a pollution control certification. We use these two
programs as examples of voluntary approaches as an environmental policy.
These two programs provide insights from different angles in two important ways.
First, the first program is in the water sector and applied by city water managers but the
second program is in the industrial manufactures level and applied by firms. Second, the
first program is at the consumer level and the second one is at the producer level.
For the second essay, we estimate how web-based Home Water Use Reports
(HWURs) affect household-level water consumption in Folsom City, California. The
HWURs under study, offered by the company Dropcountr (DC), share social
comparisons, consumption analytics, and conservation information to residential
accounts, primarily through digital communications. In mid-December of 2014, all
account holders in the City of Folsom water utility service area were offered the option of
participating in the DC pilot program on a “first come, first served” basis. The data
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utilized in this essay is a daily panel tracking single-family residential households from
January-2013 to May-2017. We found that there is a 7.8% reduction in average daily
household water consumption for a typical household under treatment of the DC
program. Results suggest that the effect of DC varies by the baseline consumption
quintile, the number of months in the program, the day of the week, quartile of the year,
message type, and enrollment wave. We also conduct empirical tests to evaluate the
channels through which DC may act to reduce consumption.
The main results of this essay indicate that with technology advances, information
provision is a low-cost way to reduce residential water consumption which could be used
in other sectors as an environmental policy as well. Using price to achieve similar
conservation would require a 34% increase in price which is politically difficult to
impose such an increase in prices. Finally, we have evidence that enrollment effects are
heterogeneous; largest impacts likely on households with outdoor water use.
In the last essay, we examine another type of voluntary environmental policy that is
adopted by the producers rather than consumers. Manufacturers have been increasingly
relying on environmental management systems (such as ISO 14001 based ones) to
comply with government regulations and reduce waste. In this essay, we investigated the
impact of ISO 14001 certification on manufacturers’ toxic release by release level.
Results show that ISO 14001 had a negative and statistically significant effect on the top
10% manufacturing sites regarding the on-site toxic release, but it did not reduce off-site
toxic release. Therefore, one should not expect ISO 14001 to have a uniform impact on
manufacturing sites’ environmental performance. For large firms, encouraging voluntary
adoption of ISO 14001 might be an effective government strategy to reduce on-site
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pollution. However, for small firms and to reduce off-site pollution, other economic
incentives or regulations are warranted.
Comparing results across three essays indicate that welfare consequences of
regulatory policies or effectiveness of voluntary policies are heterogeneous across
different subgroups. Considering this heterogeneity is important for future policy designs
as well as targeting groups with the lowest cost or highest effectiveness. Also, voluntary
policies are effective at least for some of the subgroups. In terms of consumers, results
from the second essay indicate that water users with highest baseline usage are the most
responsive to the technology adoption. In terms of producers, results of the third essay
indicate that only firms with the highest level of pollution are those that reduce pollution
after the adoption of ISO 14001 certification.
5.2 Implications and Recommendations
Timely water management policies are essential for allocating scare water resources
among different users and especially providing enhanced water access for the urban
users. Water management is far more challenging with climate change disturbing water
cycles, which changes where and how much participation falls. Most of the western states
are facing longer and frequent droughts. This pattern is not limited only to the western
states in the U.S., but many other countries are facing water shortage crisis. For example,
South Africa’s drought-stricken Cape Town has estimated 2019 for “Day Zero,” when
taps in the city run dry and people start queuing for water. In this dissertation, we shed
light on non-market-based approaches as environmental policy tools, including
distributional effects of water mandates and effectiveness of voluntarily approaches.
Results of these essays expand our knowledge of water policies and the ways we can use
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different strategies to achieve conservation goals.
Results of this dissertation indicate three main policy implications. First, the
command-and-control approach is associated with welfare losses that are not tangible to
some policymakers. Estimated welfare losses in this dissertation could be used in the
benefit-cost analysis of projects that provide enhanced water access for the urban users.
Also, it is essential to consider these estimates in evaluating the cost of environmental
policies, such as requirements for water flow in a stream. Besides, we learned that
utilities have different compliance levels with the mandate. As a future work, it would be
beneficial for policymakers to understand why some water agencies over/under comply
with the mandate requirements.
Second, through this dissertation, we learned that providing frequent and more
information for the water customers is a low-cost way to achieve conservation goals.
Interestingly, we observe that high-end water users are conserving the most. High water
users are usually those with bigger lot sizes and larger yards, which typically have higher
incomes. These are the type of households that are not very responsive to pricing policies.
Providing information also has the potential to increase the effectiveness of pricing
policies.
Finally, we observed heterogeneity in welfare losses, compliance levels with the
mandate requirements, and effectiveness of information on reducing water consumption.
One lesson for policymakers and water agencies is that they should account for these
sources of heterogeneity in their policy/program designs. Targeting specific households
could be a cost-effective way to achieve conservation goals.
As a final note, altogether these essays provide some evidence on the effectiveness of

127

non-market-based approaches as an environmental policy. However, we suggest that
cost-effectively achieving water conservation goals cannot be met only through one
specific policy, but rather a mix between price and non-price approaches. The partnership
between researchers and agencies could be beneficial to find an optimal combination of
the policies at the local level. For the agencies, it would be valuable to understand their
customers' preferences and effectiveness of different programs for the different type of
users. Using this knowledge, agencies could target specific users, achieve higher
customer satisfaction rates and meet their conservation goals. Partnership with academic
researchers could provide this knowledge for the agencies. However, without insight,
direction, and input from agencies, the research community may miss its mark.
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